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PREVENTING ERRONEOUS EXPEDITED REMOVALS:
IMMIGRATION JUDGE REVIEW AND REQUESTS FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF NEGATIVE CREDIBLE FEAR
DETERMINATIONS
Katherine Shattuck*
Abstract: The Central American refugee crisis has renewed criticism of expedited
removal, which allows immigration officials to remove without a hearing certain noncitizens
who seek to enter or have entered the United States. Asylum seekers who arrive at the border
or ports of entry without entry documents undergo a screening process to determine whether
they have a “credible fear of persecution.” An individual who receives a positive credible
fear determination is entitled to a full hearing before an immigration judge. In contrast, an
individual who receives a negative credible fear determination is typically subjected to
expedited removal. Scholars and human rights advocates have long argued that the credible
fear determination process fails to adequately identify bona fide asylum seekers, and that the
power vested in individual immigration officers is susceptible to abuse.
This Comment examines two little-discussed administrative mechanisms that can prevent
the erroneous expedited removal of asylum seekers: review of a negative credible fear
determination by an immigration judge (IJ); and requests for reconsideration (RFRs),
whereby a person who receives a negative credible fear determination may petition the
Asylum Office for a positive fear finding or a re-interview. The Comment describes the
mechanics of, and current practices surrounding, IJ review and RFRs. Data from the
Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services (USCIS) suggest that IJ review and RFRs dramatically improve the accuracy of
credible fear determinations, particularly in cases involving detained families. But the
immigration agencies have failed to consistently implement either process, undermining their
potential to prevent the removal of people who may face persecution in their home countries.
This Comment concludes by proposing reforms to fortify IJ review and RFRs. EOIR
should allow counsel to advocate on behalf of clients during IJ review and should permit
asylum seekers to introduce before the IJ information not disclosed during the credible fear
interview. Moreover, USCIS should direct the Asylum Office to grant an asylum seeker’s
RFR upon a showing that an official erred during the credible fear interview or that a second
interview will yield new information about the asylum seeker’s claim.

INTRODUCTION
In late 2015, Martiza1 fled El Salvador to seek asylum in the United
States.2 She wanted to escape her abusive husband, who began beating

* J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2018. Special thanks to
Professor Angélica Cházaro and Chris Strawn for their invaluable guidance and comments on
earlier drafts and to the exceptional team at Washington Law Review. Any errors are my own.
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her while she was pregnant with their second child and often swore he
would kill her.3 She also feared members of the MS-13 gang.4 When
Martiza reached the United States-Mexico border, she was detained and
taken to the Karnes County Residential Center, an immigration detention
facility in Texas that holds nearly 600 women and children.5 There an
asylum officer interviewed Martiza to determine if she was eligible to
apply for asylum.6
The interview produced only part of Martiza’s story. A year and a
half before Martiza fled El Salvador, the Board of Immigration Appeals
held in a landmark decision that survivors of gender-based violence may
qualify for asylum.7 But the asylum officer never asked Martiza if she
suffered domestic violence in El Salvador; and Martiza, who assumed
that MS-13’s extortion and death threats were more important to her
asylum claim, said nothing about her husband’s abuse.8 At the end of the
interview, the asylum officer concluded that Martiza lacked a credible
fear of persecution, and was ineligible to apply for asylum. 9 Martiza
appealed that finding to an immigration judge (IJ).10 The IJ affirmed her
negative credible fear determination.11 Martiza was then ordered to be

1. “Martiza” is a pseudonym. See Letter from Am. Immigration Council et al. to Directors of U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Servs. and Immigration and Customs Enf’t Concerning Due Process
Violations at Det. Facilities 4 (Dec. 24, 2015), http://www.aila.org/advo-media/aila-correspondence/
2015/letter-uscis-ice-due-process [https://perma.cc/72U5-C8SF] [hereinafter Letter on Due Process
Violations].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.at 4–5.
5. Id. at 4; DHS ADVISORY COMM. ON FAMILY RESIDENTIAL CTRS., REPORT OF THE DHS
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON FAMILY RESIDENTIAL CENTERS 3 (2016), https://www.ice.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/Report/2016/ACFRC-sc-16093.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T6N3-LPLP]
[hereinafter DHS ADVISORY COMM. REPORT]. The “residential center” in Karnes is managed by the
GEO Group, a private prison corporation. See Karnes County Residential Center, GEO GRP., INC.,
https://www.geogroup.com/FacilityDetail/FacilityID/58 [https://perma.cc/T78R-YQ42] .
6. Letter on Due Process Violations, supra note 1, at 4–5; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii)
(2012) (explaining that an individual who is found to have “a credible fear of persecution” may
proceed to seek asylum).
7. In re A-R-C-G- et al., 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 389 (B.I.A. 2014) (holding that “married women in
Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship” can constitute a cognizable particular social
group for purposes of an asylum or withholding of removal claim).
8. Letter on Due Process Violations, supra note 1, at 4–5.
9. Id. at 5. Courts continue to grapple with whether, and under what circumstances, extortion
provides a basis for a viable asylum claim. See, e.g., Oliva v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 53, 59 (4th Cir. 2015)
(recognizing that “extortion itself can constitute persecution”).
10. Letter on Due Process Violations, supra note 1, at 4–5.
11. Id.
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removed to El Salvador without a hearing, according to a law that
authorizes the fast-track removal of noncitizens without valid entry
documents.12
Racing against the clock, a team of volunteer lawyers submitted a
request for reconsideration (RFR) to the Houston Asylum Office on
Martiza’s behalf.13 In the RFR, they noted that the asylum officer had
failed to elicit during the credible fear interview information about the
domestic violence Martiza suffered in El Salvador.14 Martiza’s attorneys
requested that the Asylum Office grant Martiza a second interview so
that she could fully explain her fear of returning home. 15 The next day,
the Asylum Office denied the RFR.16 Martiza was put on a plane and
flown back to El Salvador to face the man she thought would kill her.17
Martiza is one of a growing number of noncitizens who have been
denied humanitarian protection in the United States and summarily
returned to violent homelands they said they feared.18 Historically,
noncitizens who entered the United States and requested asylum were
allowed to present their claims for protection before an immigration
court.19 But the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) upended that process.20 IIRIRA

12. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A) (2012).
13. Letter on Due Process Violations, supra note 1, at 4–5. The eight regional asylum offices in
the United States form part of the Refugee, Asylum, and International Operations Directorate, a
division of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. See Refugee, Asylum, and International
Operations Directorate, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/aboutus/directorates-and-program-offices/refugee-asylum-and-international-operations-directorate
[https://perma.cc/Z7CC-N26V].
14. Letter on Due Process Violations, supra note 1, at 4–5
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Sarah Stillman, No Refuge, NEW YORKER, Jan. 15, 2017, at 32, 34 (describing the
Global Migration Project’s database of cases in which noncitizens removed from the United States
suffered death, torture, kidnapping, sexual assault, and other harms in their home countries); Sibylla
Brodzinsky & Ed Pilkington, US Government Deporting Central American Migrants to Their
Deaths, GUARDIAN (Oct. 12, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/oct/12/obamaimmigration-deportations-central-america [https://perma.cc/2AJW-598N] (referencing study that
identified eighty-three noncitizens who were deported to their deaths in El Salvador, Guatemala,
and Honduras); Trauma in Family Immigration Detention, HUM. RTS. WATCH (May 15, 2015),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/05/15/us-trauma-family-immigration-detention-0
[https://perma.cc/93ZD-5GJL] (recounting stories of two female asylum seekers who were removed
from the United States and severely abused in their home countries).
19. See infra section I.B.
20. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
110 Stat. 3009-546.
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introduced forms of summary deportation, including expedited removal
and reinstatement of removal, that allow immigration officers to return
certain noncitizens to their home countries without a hearing before an
IJ.21 These days, most people who are removed from the United States
never appear in a courtroom.22
Asylum seekers are supposed to be spared immediate summary
removal.23 Noncitizens who arrive at a United States border or port of
entry and say they fear returning home are referred to asylum officers for
interviews to determine whether their fear of persecution is sufficiently
“credible” to support an asylum claim.24 If an officer determines that a
noncitizen has “a significant possibility” of “establish[ing] eligibility for
asylum,” the noncitizen is placed into regular removal proceedings and
allowed to present a claim for relief before an IJ.25 In contrast, a
noncitizen who receives a negative credible fear determination is subject
to removal “without further hearing or review.”26
The past decade has seen sharp increases in recently arrived
noncitizens who express fear of persecution. In fiscal year 2009, United
States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) made 5,369
21. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A) (2012) (outlining expedited removal); id. § 1231(a)(5)
(outlining reinstatement of removal).
22. Jennifer Lee Koh, Removal in the Shadows of Immigration Court, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 181,
183 (2017) (“[T]he vast majority of cases in which the government issues removal orders against
noncitizens never reach the immigration courts.”). Of the 340,056 noncitizens deported in fiscal
year 2016, 141,518 people were subjected to expedited removal and 143,003 people were subjected
to reinstatement of removal. BRYAN BAKER, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2016, at 8 (2017),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Enforcement_Actions_2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HU4N-VAYY].
23. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii).
24. Id.
25. Id. (a noncitizen determined to have “a credible fear of persecution” must “be detained for
further consideration of the application for asylum”); 8 U.S.C. § 1229 (outlining initiation of
removal proceedings); 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(f) (2017) (a noncitizen determined to have “a credible fear
of persecution or torture” will receive “full consideration of the asylum and withholding of removal
claim”). Regular removal proceedings, also known as “section 240 removal proceedings” for the
section of the Immigration and Nationality Act that corresponds to 8 U.S.C. § 1229, take place in
immigration court and afford noncitizens greater procedural protections.
26. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(I). This process differs for noncitizens who seek humanitarian
protection in the United States after having been removed. These noncitizens face the threat of
reinstatement of removal and undergo “reasonable fear” interviews with asylum officers. 8 C.F.R.
§§ 208.31(b), 1208.31(b). If a person is determined to have a “reasonable fear of persecution or
torture,” that person may apply for withholding of removal or relief under the Convention Against
Torture before an IJ. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.31(e), 1208.31(e). Noncitizens previously removed are
statutorily barred from seeking asylum. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5). This Comment focuses on expedited
removal and credible fear interviews; however, many of its insights are relevant to the reinstatement
context, as well.
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credible fear determinations.27 By fiscal year 2016, that figure had
soared to 92,990 determinations.28 The leap largely reflected rising
migration from Central America: since 2008, the United Nations has
recorded a fivefold increase in the number of asylum seekers who have
fled El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras for the United States.29
USCIS statistics show that the majority of credible fear interviews result
in positive credible fear determinations.30 But each year asylum officers
issue thousands of negative credible fear determinations to putative
asylum seekers.31 In fiscal year 2016 alone, 9,697 individuals received
negative credible fear determinations.32 Put otherwise, there were 4,334
more credible fear denials in 2016 than there were determinations in
2009.33
As Martiza’s case suggests, the credible fear process is fraught with
potential for error. Language barriers, official oversight, and trauma or
disability may prevent an asylum seeker from disclosing in an initial
interview why that person fled to the United States.34 Legal scholars and
human rights observers have long argued that the credible fear process
fails to adequately identify bona fide asylum seekers, and that the power
vested in individual immigration officials is susceptible to abuse.35 The
27. Asylum Abuse: Is it Overwhelming Our Borders? Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 113th Cong. 5 (2013) (statement of Rep. Zoe Lofgren) [hereinafter Asylum Hearing].
28. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., CREDIBLE FEAR AND REASONABLE FEAR
STATISTICS AND NATIONALITY REPORT (2016), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/
Outreach/Upcoming%20National%20Engagements/PED_CredibleFearReasonableFearStatisticsNat
ionalityReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/N2PF-WYE3] [hereinafter CREDIBLE FEAR STATISTICS 2016].
29. António Guterres, Foreword to U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, WOMEN ON THE RUN:
FIRST-HAND ACCOUNTS OF REFUGEES FLEEING EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA, HONDURAS, AND
MEXICO (2015), http://www.unhcr.org/publications/operations/5630f24c6/women-run.html [https://
perma.cc/GUY3-C8WV] [hereinafter WOMEN ON THE RUN].
30. Positive credible fear determinations were granted in 73,081 of 92,990 cases in fiscal year
2016. CREDIBLE FEAR STATISTICS 2016, supra note 28.
31. See id.
32. Id.
33. Id.; Asylum Hearing, supra note 27, at 5.
34. See, e.g., KATHRYN SHEPHERD & ROYCE BERNSTEIN MURRAY, THE PERILS OF EXPEDITED
REMOVAL: HOW FAST-TRACK DEPORTATIONS JEOPARDIZE ASYLUM SEEKERS 1–3 (2017),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/the_perils_of_expedited_r
emoval_how_fast-track_deportations_jeopardize_detained_asylum_seekers.pdf [https://perma.cc/H
DV2-UHXT] (summarizing report on the “serious obstacles” many noncitizens face to accessing the
asylum process).
35. See, e.g., Asylum Hearing, supra note 27, at 166 (statement of Leslie E. Vélez, Senior
Protection Officer, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) (stating that the “significant
possibility” standard for establishing credible fear under United States law is so onerous as to be
inconsistent with international standards); Michele R. Pistone & John J. Hoeffner, Rules are Made
to Be Broken: How the Process of Expedited Removal Fails Asylum Seekers, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
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Obama and Trump administrations’ attempts to use expedited removal to
deter migration from Central America have renewed such concerns.36 So
has the Trump administration’s pledge to expand Department of
Homeland Security’s (DHS’s) authority to subject noncitizens to
expedited removal.37
This Comment discusses two administrative mechanisms embedded
in the credible fear process that may prevent the erroneous expedited
removal of bona fide asylum seekers: (1) IJ review of negative credible
fear determinations,38 and (2) RFRs, whereby a person whose negative
credible fear determination has been affirmed by an IJ may petition the
Asylum Office for a positive credible fear determination or a reinterview.39 Focusing on cases involving detained families,40 this
Comment argues that IJ review and RFRs are crucial, if imperfect, safety
valves in the expedited removal regime. In fiscal years 2014 through
2016, IJs vacated 1,157 negative credible fear determinations in cases
involving detained families.41 During the same period, RFRs prompted
the Asylum Office to reverse over 200 negative credible fear
determinations in cases involving detained families.42 These figures
underscore both the deficiencies of the credible fear process and the
bona fide nature of the vast majority of the claims for protection asserted
by Central American families. Yet the government has failed to issue
updated guidance on IJ review and RFRs, and agency officials
inconsistently administer both processes. As a result, IJ review and
167, 193–94 (2006) (describing pervasive “rule-breaking” by government officials during
screenings of undocumented persons at ports of entry); Jaya Ramji, Legislating Away International
Law: The Refugee Provisions of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act,
37 STAN. J. INT’L L. 117, 137 (2001) (“The ‘expedited removal’ process violates the rights of
refugees and abrogates the duties of the United States to refugees in numerous ways.”); SHEPHERD
& BERNSTEIN MURRAY, supra note 34, at 3 (“The credible fear interview process is potentially rife
with procedural errors.”).
36. See infra section I.A.
37. See infra section I.A.
38. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III) (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.30(g)(2) (2017).
39. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.30(g)(2)(iv)(A); Memorandum from Michael A. Benson, Exec. Assoc.
Comm’r for Field Operations, Immigration & Naturalization Servs., to Reg’l Dirs., Dist. Dirs. &
Asylum Office Dirs. regarding Expedited Removal: Additional Policy Guidance (Dec. 30, 1997)
[hereinafter Expedited Removal Policy Guidance].
40. There are currently three operational family detention centers in the United States. The
Karnes County Residential Center, located in Karnes City, Texas, has the capacity to hold
approximately 595 women and children. The South Texas Family Residential Center, located in
Dilley, Texas, has a 2,400-bed capacity. The Berks Family Residential Center holds approximately
100 people. DHS ADVISORY COMM. REPORT, supra note 5, at 3.
41. See infra Part III.
42. See infra Part III.
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RFRs do not reliably forestall the expedited removal of noncitizens with
potentially viable claims for relief.
Three areas of scholarship inform this Comment. First, IJ review and
RFRs illustrate what Inés Valdez, Mat Coleman, and Amna Akbar have
described as the “paralegal” nature of immigration enforcement: the
everyday practices surrounding RFRs, and, to a lesser extent, IJ review,
are shaped less by codified rules than by negotiations between frontline
immigration officials and nongovernmental actors who represent asylum
seekers.43 Second, the Comment sheds light on the complicated and
often arbitrary “shadow proceedings” outside immigration courts that
lead to the majority of removal orders against noncitizens.44 Finally, the
Comment draws upon, and seeks to contribute to, research on the
intersection of family detention, asylum law, and pro bono efforts to
protect the rights of detained families.45
The first three parts of this Comment describe the mechanics and
significance of RFRs: what they are, how they function in practice, and
why they matter. Part I examines the recent increase in migration to the
United States from Central America, situates IJ review and RFRs in
43. Inés Valdez, Mat Coleman, & Amna Akbar, Missing in Action: Practice, Paralegality, and
the Nature of Immigration Enforcement, 21 CITIZENSHIP STUDS. 547, 549–53 (2017); see also
HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW 121 (2014) (“In theory, immigration law
starts with Congress, but in practice it is made in the field.”).
44. Koh, supra note 22, at 193 (arguing that “the standard narrative about immigration
adjudication is incomplete” because it overlooks “types of removal that take place in the shadows of
immigration court”); see also DANIEL KANSTROOM, AFTERMATH: DEPORTATION LAW AND THE
NEW AMERICAN DIASPORA 52 (2012) (“[A] bewildering array of new fast-track mechanisms with
such names as ‘expedited removal’ render much of the late twentieth- and early twenty-first century
story of deportation one of deformalization in which rights guaranteed since the late nineteenth
century have been eliminated.” (emphasis in original)); Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Rise of
Speed Deportation and the Role of Discretion, 5 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1, 6–14 (2014) (discussing
expedited removal, reinstatement of removal, and administrative removal).
45. See, e.g., Ingrid Eagly, Steven Shafer & Jana Whalley, Detaining Families: A Study of
Asylum Adjudication in Family Detention, 106 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at
101, 102) (on file with author) (presenting “the first empirical analysis of asylum adjudication in
family detention”); Karen Musalo & Eunice Lee, Seeking a Rational Approach to a Regional
Refugee Crisis: Lessons from the Summer 2014 “Surge” of Central American Women and Children
at the U.S.-Mexico Border, 5 J. MIGRATION & HUM. SEC. 137, 140 (recommending that the United
States government end family detention and “recognize the humanitarian crisis occurring in the
Northern Triangle countries and the legitimate need of individuals from these countries for refugee
protection”); Margaret H. Taylor & Kit Johnson, “Vast Hordes . . . Crowding in Upon Us”: The
Executive Branch’s Response to Mass Migration and the Legacy of Chae Chan Ping, 68 OKLA. L.
REV. 185, 186 (arguing that the detention of asylum-seeking families from Central America is “the
modern iteration of Chae Chan Ping”); Stephen W. Manning, The Artesia Report, INNOVATION L.
LAB, https://innovationlawlab.org/the-artesia-report/the-artesia-report/ [https://perma.cc/W6QP-B9
AK] (describing pro bono response to detention and deportation policies in the family detention
center in Artesia, New Mexico in 2014).
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statutory and regulatory context, and identifies sources of error in the
credible fear determination process. Part II explores the evolution of, and
current practices surrounding, IJ review and RFRs. It demonstrates that
IJ review was intended to prevent the wrongful expedited removal of
asylum seekers with meritorious claims, and shows how the Executive
Office for Immigration Review’s (EOIR’s) guidance on the regulations
governing IJ review has undermined that promise. Additionally, Part II
examines the official guidance on RFRs. Part III discusses government
data on negative credible fear determinations vacated through IJ review
or RFRs, focusing on the family detention context. The data suggest that
both methods of review play vital roles in preventing the expedited
removal of individuals with potentially viable claims for protection.
Part IV proposes reforms to fortify IJ review and RFRs. EOIR should
allow counsel to advocate on behalf of clients during IJ review and
should permit asylum seekers to introduce before the IJ information not
disclosed during the credible fear interview. Moreover, USCIS should
direct the Asylum Office to grant an asylum seeker’s RFR upon a
showing that an official erred during the credible fear interview or that a
second interview will yield new information about the asylum seeker’s
claim. This Comment concludes by contending that IJ review and RFRs
will consistently prevent erroneous expedited removals only when
asylum seekers have greater access to counsel.
I.

LEGAL AND HUMANITARIAN BACKGROUND TO THE
CREDIBLE FEAR DETERMINATION PROCESS

Credible fear determinations occur at the intersection of two statutory
schemes: expedited removal, which subjects undocumented persons who
seek to enter the United States to removal without a hearing; and
asylum, a form of protection available to individuals who fear
persecution on account of their race, religion, nationality, political
opinion, or membership in a particular social group. This Part begins by
describing recent migration to the United States from Central America,
which has rekindled criticisms of expedited removal as applied to
asylum seekers. It then provides overviews of expedited removal and
asylum, focusing on the credible fear determination process. This Part
concludes by discussing the potential for error in credible fear
interviews.
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The Central American Refugee Crisis Has Brought Renewed
Attention to Expedited Removal

Since the summer of 2014, tens of thousands of families and
unaccompanied children have requested humanitarian protection at the
United States-Mexico border.46 Most families have migrated from the
Northern Triangle of Central America, which includes Guatemala, El
Salvador, and Honduras.47 They flee extortion and recruitment by
criminal gangs, pervasive gender-related violence, and some of the
highest homicide rates in the world.48 In fiscal year 2014, 68,445 family
units presented or were apprehended at the United States’s southern
border.49 The flow of asylum seekers slowed slightly in 2015, but the
refugee crisis continues.50 Over 153,000 family units arrived at ports of
entry in the southwestern border region in fiscal years 2016 and 2017.51

46. JONATHAN T. HISKY ET AL., AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING THE CENTRAL
AMERICAN REFUGEE CRISIS: WHY THEY ARE FLEEING AND HOW UNITED STATES POLICIES ARE
FAILING TO DETER THEM 1 (2016), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/
files/research/understanding_the_centralamericanrefugeecrisis.pdf [https://perma.cc/S2GL-JNWS]
[hereinafter UNDERSTANDING THE CENTRAL AMERICAN REFUGEE CRISIS].
47. Id. Growing numbers of noncitizens from Haiti and countries in Africa and Asia have
presented at the United States-Mexico border, as well. See, e.g., Alexandra Zavis, The Desperate
Trek: The Sharp Rise in Non-Latin American Migrants Trying to Cross into the U.S. from Mexico,
L.A. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/projects/la-fg-immigration-trek-americatijuana/ [https://perma.cc/4CYC-BVU5] (noting that in 2016 “some 15,000 migrants from outside
Latin America passed through” the Mexican state of Baja California en route to the United States).
48. UNDERSTANDING THE CENTRAL AMERICAN REFUGEE CRISIS, supra note 46, at 3; see also
Kirk Semple, Fleeing Gangs, Central American Families Surge Toward U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/13/world/467esource/fleeing-gangs-central-american-fam
ilies-surge-toward-us.html [https://perma.cc/CA98-B4ZT]; AM. BAR ASS’N, FAMILY IMMIGRATION
DETENTION: WHY THE PAST CANNOT BE PROLOGUE 14 (2015), https://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/administrative/Immigration/FamilyDetentionReport2015.authcheckdam.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5PDQ-H7P8] (“Homicide rates in the Northern Triangle are among the highest in
the world, with Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras consistently reporting three of the five
highest national murder rates.”); Central America: Femicides and Gender-Based Violence, CTR.
FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUDIES, https://cgrs.uchastings.edu//our-work/central-america-femici
des-and-gender-based-violence [https://perma.cc/RZ35-PAP8] (noting that Guatemala, Honduras,
and El Salvador have some of the world’s highest rates of violence against women and girls).
49. Total Family Unit Apprehensions by Month, FY 2013–2017, U.S. BORDER PATROL (Dec.
2017), https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2017-Dec/BP%20Total%20Month
ly%20Family%20Units%20by%20Sector%2C%20FY13-FY17.pdf [https://perma.cc/QZ59-WJBF]
[hereinafter Total Family Unit Apprehensions].
50. Musalo & Lee, supra note 45, at 139 (suggesting that the “temporary drop” in arriving asylum
seekers in early 2015 “likely reflects [the United States’s] interdiction policies [in Mexico] rather
than any ‘deterrent’ effect of harsh policies at or within [the United States’] own borders”).
51. Total Family Unit Apprehensions, supra note 49.
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Most families appear to merit humanitarian relief.52 According to the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, persons “fleeing
epidemic levels of violence, including gender-based violence, in El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras . . . present a clear need for
international protection.”53
Nonetheless, in mid-2014, the Obama administration undertook “an
aggressive deterrence strategy” to dissuade asylum seekers from fleeing
the Northern Triangle for the United States.54 Federal officials launched
a media campaign in Central America that emphasized the dangers of
the journey through Mexico and suggested that persons escaping
violence would “not get papers” in the United States.55 The federal
government also aided operations in Mexico to apprehend Central
American asylum seekers en route to the United States.56 Meanwhile,
DHS escalated detention policies, contracting with private prison
corporations to open two family detention centers in the border region.57
Asylum-seeking families who in prior years would have been released
before their hearings were detained on prohibitively high bonds,
sometimes for months.58 As Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh
52. LARA DOMÍNGUEZ, ADRIENNE LEE & ELIZABETH LEISERSON, U.S. DETENTION AND
REMOVAL OF ASYLUM SEEKERS: AN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW ANALYSIS 1 (2016),
https://law.yale.edu/system/files/area/center/schell/human_rights_first_-_immigration_detention__final_-_20160620_for_publication.pdf [https://perma.cc/98DE-LBZY].
53. WOMEN ON THE RUN, supra note 29, at 2.
54. David Nakamura, Obama Calls for “Aggressive Deterrence Strategy” for Border Crossers,
WASH. POST (June 30, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2014/06/30/
obama-calls-for-aggressive-deterrence-strategy-for-border-crossers/ [https://perma.cc/4MCA-UC
WN].
55. Valerie Hamilton, How the US Is Trying to Deter Migrants from Central America—with
Music, PUB. RADIO INT’L (July 17, 2014), https://www.pri.org/stories/2014-07-17/how-marimbabeat-helping-us-border-patrol-deter-migrants-coming-border
[https://perma.cc/NYF8-9T9U];
UNDERSTANDING THE CENTRAL AMERICAN REFUGEE CRISIS, supra note 46, at 1.
56. See ADAM ISACSON, MAUREEN MEYER & HANNAH SMITH, INCREASED ENFORCEMENT AT
MEXICO’S SOUTHERN BORDER: AN UPDATE ON SECURITY, MIGRATION, AND U.S. ASSISTANCE 15–
18 (2015), https://www.wola.org/files/WOLA_Increased_Enforcement_at_Mexico’s_Southern_Bo
rder_Nov2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q3F7-2H7J].
57. See Julia Preston, Detention Center Presented as Deterrent to Border Crossings, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 15, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/16/us/homeland-security-chief-opens-largestimmigration-detention-center-in-us.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=secondcolumn-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/8TMQ-V76D].
58. See, e.g., A One-Week Snapshot: Human Rights First at Dilley Family Detention Facility
Post-Flores Ruling, HUM. RTS. FIRST (Aug. 6, 2015), https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/re
source/one-week-snapshot-human-rights-first-dilley-family-detention-facility-post-flores-ruling
[https://perma.cc/92YX-769G] (documenting forty cases in the Dilley family detention center in
where “ICE officers set initial bonds at $7,000 to $9,500,” which the typical “indigent asylumseeking famil[y] cannot pay”); DHS ADVISORY COMM. REPORT, supra note 5, at 15–16 n.65
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Johnson explained, such measures were calculated to send a clear
message to Central Americans seeking protecting in the United States:
“we will send you back.”59
The Obama administration’s deterrence strategy also relied on
expedited removal.60 Created by IIRIRA, expedited removal allows
individual immigration officers to order the removal, without
administrative or judicial review, of a person found inadmissible at a
port of entry or within 100 miles of a United States border.61 Before
2014, the government declined to place families apprehended at or near
the border into expedited removal proceedings.62 Parents with children
were typically assigned to regular removal proceedings, which entail a
hearing before an IJ, and given a notice to appear in immigration court at
a later date.63 As migration continued to rise, however, DHS changed
course. It began to place family units into expedited removal
proceedings, partly to deter other families from seeking asylum in the
United States.64 The strategy was of a piece with DHS’s widespread
reliance on expedited removal during the Obama years. In total, over
141,000 noncitizens were subjected to expedited removal in fiscal year
2016, accounting for 41.6% of all removals from the United States.65
Detention and expedited removal quickly became central to the
Trump administration’s approach to border enforcement, as well.
Among Donald Trump’s first actions as President was an executive
order on “border security” in which he reiterated his administration’s
commitment to enforcing expedited removal.66 In February 2017,
(collecting reports on disproportionately high bonds in family detention centers); Manning, supra
note 45, at Part XI (stating that “[a] preliminary review” of the data gathered by a pro bono project
at the family detention center in Artesia, New Mexico, showed “that the mean bond amount set by
the Headquarters immigration judges was $17,000” during the first several weeks of the facility’s
existence).
59. Review of the President’s Emergency Supplemental Request for Unaccompanied Children
and Related Matters: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Appropriations, 113th Cong. 14 (2014)
(prepared statement of Hon. Jeh Johnson, Sec’y of Dep’t of Homeland Sec.) [hereinafter Surge
Hearing].
60. Taylor & Johnson, supra note 45, 193–201 (describing Obama administration’s use of
expedited removal against Central American asylum seekers).
61. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A) (2012); see infra section II.C.
62. DHS ADVISORY COMM. REPORT, supra note 5, at 3.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. BAKER, supra note 22, at 8.
66. Exec. Order 13,767, Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements, 82 Fed.
Reg. 8793, 8796 (Jan. 30, 2017) (directing the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security to
“take appropriate action to apply, in his sole and unreviewable discretion, the provisions of
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Secretary of Homeland Security John Kelly issued a memorandum
directing DHS to expand immigration detention, escalate its use of
expedited removal, and “enhance” credible fear determinations.67 A few
months later, the Trump administration terminated the Central American
Minors refugee program, an Obama-era initiative that allowed parents
with lawful status in the United States to petition for refugee status on
behalf of children in the Northern Triangle.68 Advocates fear that such
measures will jeopardize the claims for protection of bona fide asylum
seekers from Central America and nations around the world.69
B.

“Credible Fear of Persecution” Is the Linchpin of an Asylum
Claim

Asylum is a form of humanitarian protection granted to a noncitizen
who is present in the United States and qualifies as a “refugee” under
United States law.70 The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) defines
section 235(b)(1)(A)(i) and (ii) of the INA to the aliens designated under
section 235(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II)”).
67. Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., to Kevin McAleenan, Acting
Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., et al. (Feb. 20, 2017), at 6–7, https://www.dhs.gov/
sites/default/files/publications/17_0220_S1_Implementing-the-Presidents-Border-Security-Immig
ration-Enforcement-Improvement-Policies.pdf [https://perma.cc/HG2D-3DKL] (claiming that “[t]he
surge of illegal immigration at the southern border has overwhelmed federal agencies and resources
and has created a significant national security vulnerability to the United States”). An internal DHS
memo from July 2017 indicates that the Trump administration is considering proposals that would
allow DHS to place into expedited removal proceedings noncitizens apprehended in the interior of
the country who cannot prove that they have been present in the United States for at least ninety
days. See Abigail Hauslohner & David Nakamura, In Memo, Trump Administration Weighs
Expanding the Expedited Deportation Powers of DHS, WASH. POST (July 14, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-memo-trump-administration-weighsexpanding-the-expedited-deportation-powers-of-dhs/2017/07/14/ce5f16b4-68ba-11e7-9928
22d00a47778f_story.html [https://perma.cc/73SJ-HAVC].
68. U.S. Program for Central American Child Refugees to End Thursday, REUTERS (Nov. 8,
2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-minors/u-s-program-for-central-america
n-child-refugees-to-end-Thursday-idUSKBN1D905C [https://perma.cc/5KG5-7QK7].
69. See, e.g., HARVARD LAW SCH. IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE CLINICAL PROGRAM, THE IMPACT
OF PRESIDENT TRUMP’S EXECUTIVE ORDERS ON ASYLUM SEEKERS 1 (2017), https://today.law.
harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Report-Impact-of-Trump-Executive-Orders-on-AsylumSeekers.pdf [https://perma.cc/CY5S-PSBL] (arguing that President Trump’s executive orders of
January 2017 “represent a dramatic restriction of access to asylum and other immigration
protections in the United States”); HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, ASYLUM UNDER THREAT: IMPACT OF
PRESIDENT TRUMP’S IMMIGRATION EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY’S MEMORANDA ON ASYLUM SEEKERS 1 (2017), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/
default/files/hrf-asylum-under-threat.pdf [https://perma.cc/FU5V-H7WF] (stating that the measures
outlined in the executive orders “would multiply the many challenges already faced by refugees
attempting to navigate the U.S. asylum process”).
70. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1) (2012).
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a “refugee” as any person who is outside that person’s country of
nationality and is “unable or unwilling to return to” that country
“because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account
of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion.”71 Additionally, the INA codifies the United States’s
nonrefoulement obligations under international law.72 In accord with the
United Nations 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, the
United States must refrain from removing a noncitizen to a country if the
noncitizen’s “life or freedom would be threatened in that country
because of the” noncitizen’s “race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.”73
The asylum application process takes either an affirmative or a
defensive posture.74 Affirmative applicants apply for asylum after having
entered the United States on a valid non-immigrant visa or without
inspection.75 They thus identify themselves to DHS through their
applications to USCIS, a division of DHS.76 In contrast, defensive
applicants apply for asylum as a defense to removal, typically after being
apprehended by DHS.77 Defensive claims are filed with EOIR, the
division of the Department of Justice that houses the immigration
courts.78 Persons who present at a port of entry without valid entry
documents and are found to have a “credible fear of persecution” are
placed into regular removal proceedings under section 240 of the INA,
where they may assert defensive claims for protection.79
The credible fear screening process effectively begins before an
asylum seeker is referred to the Asylum Office for a credible fear
interview. When individuals without entry documents arrive at the
border or an airport, they undergo “secondary inspection[s]” by Customs

71. Id. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
72. See U.N. HIGH COMM’N FOR REFUGEES, 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF
REFUGEES 30 (1967), http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html [https://perma.cc/2NRK-DZAF]
(barring any country from “expel[ling] or return[ing] . . . a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the
frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened”).
73. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (codifying the nonrefoulement standard).
74. T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY
796–97 (8th ed. 2016).
75. Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette:
Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 305 (2007).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 305–06.
78. Id. at 306.
79. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2012); id. § 1229a(a)(1).
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and Border Protection (CBP), a division of DHS.80 During secondary
inspections, CBP officers are required to read a brief statement that
describes the protections available to foreign nationals who have
suffered torture or persecution in their home countries.81 Additionally,
officers must ask undocumented arrivals questions designed to shed light
on their eligibility for asylum, and must record and read back the
statements made in reply.82 If at any point an individual expresses intent
to seek asylum or fear of returning home, the officer must detain and
refer the individual for a credible fear interview with an asylum officer.83
Credible fear interviews are intended to ferret out fraudulent and
clearly nonviable asylum claims. The INA defines “credible fear of
persecution” to mean “that there is a significant possibility, taking into
account the credibility of the statements made by the alien in support of
the alien’s claim and such other facts as are known to the officer, that the
alien could establish eligibility for asylum.”84 As USCIS’s Asylum
Division Officer Training Course instructs, “the credible fear ‘significant
possibility’ standard of proof can be best understood as requiring that the
applicant ‘demonstrate a substantial and realistic possibility of
succeeding,’ but not requiring the applicant to show that he or she is
more likely than not going to succeed when before an immigration
judge.”85 In making this determination, the asylum officer must consider

80. Pistone & Hoeffner, supra note 35, at 173; see also Michele R. Pistone & Phillip G. Schrag,
The New Asylum Rule: Improved but Still Unfair, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 37 (2001).
81. Pistone & Hoeffner, supra note 35, at 169.
82. Id.; see also 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(4) (2017). Specifically, officers must ask: (1) “Why did you
leave your home country or country of last residence?” (2) “Do you have any fear or concern about
being returned to your home country or being removed from the United States?” (3) “Would you be
harmed if you are returned to your home country or country of last residence?” ALLEN KELLER ET
AL., STUDY ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL 13 (2005), https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/
default/files/472esources/stories/pdf/asylum_seekers/evalCredibleFear.pdf [https://perma.cc/N52EXKYA].
83. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(4) (stating that if an applicant “indicates an
intention to apply for asylum, or expresses a fear of persecution or torture,” the “examining
immigration officer shall record sufficient information in the sworn statement to establish and
record that the alien has indicated such intention, fear, or concern”).
84. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v); see also Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention
and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg.
10,312, 10,317 (Mar. 6, 1997) (stating that federal immigration officials would be trained to “ensure
that the [credible fear] standard is implemented in a way which will encourage flexibility and a
broad application of the statutory standard”).
85. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., ASYLUM DIVISION OFFICER TRAINING COURSE,
CREDIBLE FEAR OF PERSECUTION AND TORTURE DETERMINATIONS 16 (2017) https://drive.google.
com/file/d/0B_6gbFPjVDoxY0FCczROOFZ4SVk/edit [https://perma.cc/56Z3-REVH] [hereinafter
2017 LESSON PLAN ON CREDIBLE FEAR].
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whether the asylum seeker’s case “presents novel or unique issues that
merit consideration in a full hearing before an immigration judge,” as
well as the “credibility” of the asylum seeker.86 Credibility may be
informed by the consistency of the asylum seeker’s statements during
the credible fear interview with those made to the inspecting CBP
officer, the level of detail contained in the asylum seeker’s statements,
and the asylum seeker’s “demeanor, candor, and responsiveness.”87
DHS has adopted a number of regulations intended to ensure that
bona fide asylum seekers are spared expedited removal.88 The asylum
officer must “conduct the [credible fear] interview in a nonadversarial
manner, separate and apart from the general public.”89 If the asylum
officer determines that an individual “is unable to participate effectively
in the interview because of illness, fatigue, or other impediments, the
officer may reschedule the interview.”90 Additionally, the asylum officer
must ensure that the asylum seeker “has an understanding of the credible
fear determination process” before proceeding with the interview.91
Interpretation services must be provided if the asylum seeker is “unable
to proceed effectively in English” and the officer “is unable to proceed
competently in a language chosen by the alien.”92 At the end of the
interview, the asylum officer must create “a summary of the material
facts as stated by the applicant,” and is required to “review the summary
with the alien and provide the alien with an opportunity to correct any
errors therein.”93 A negative credible fear determination is not final until
approved by a supervisory officer.94 Finally, as discussed in more detail
below, an asylum seeker who has received a negative credible fear
determination may ask an IJ to review that determination before being
removed.95
In theory, these measures ensure that persons with meritorious claims
are allowed to present their cases in immigration courts; in practice, their
uneven execution makes noncitizens vulnerable to erroneous removals.96
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

8 C.F.R. § 208.30(e)(2)–(4).
2017 LESSON PLAN ON CREDIBLE FEAR, supra note 85, at 18–23.
See Pistone & Hoeffner, supra note 35, at 169.
8 C.F.R. § 208.30(d).
Id. § 208.30(d)(l).
Id. § 208.30(d)(2).
Id. § 208.30(d)(5).
Id. § 208.30(d)(6); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(l)(B)(iii)(II) (2012).
8 C.F.R. § 208.30(e)(7).
See infra section II.A.
See infra section I.D.
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The next section examines expedited removal, the fast track to
deportation that asylum seekers face when the credible fear interview’s
procedural safeguards fail.
C.

Expedited Removal Allows Immigration Officers to Order
Individuals Removed from the United States, Typically Without
Administrative or Judicial Review

Expedited removal is a summary and ostensibly efficient process; it
deputizes individual immigration officers near borders and ports of entry
to issue removal orders against individuals found ineligible to enter the
United States. This section examines the purposes of expedited removal,
the types of noncitizens who are subjected to expedited removal, and the
limitations on judicial review of expedited removal orders.
1.

Individuals Who Lack Valid Entry Documents May Face Expedited
Removal

IIRIRA, which implemented expedited removal, took effect on April
1, 1997.97 Before that date, undocumented persons apprehended inside
the United States were deemed “deportable,” and were placed in
“deportation” proceedings.98 In contrast, individuals who arrived at a
United States port of entry without valid entry documents were deemed
“excludable,” and were placed in exclusion proceedings.99 Persons
alleged to be excludable were entitled to an individualized hearing in an
immigration court.100 They enjoyed the right to retain counsel and could
testify, present witnesses, and cross-examine witnesses before the IJ.101
Asylum seekers in exclusion proceedings were not required to establish

97. For a discussion of the major changes in immigration law that IIRIRA introduced, as well as
the political climate in which it was adopted, see U.S. Representative Zoe Lofgren, A Decade of
Radical Change in Immigration Law: An Inside Perspective, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 349 (2005).
98. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 25 (1982).
99. See id. (“The deportation hearing is the usual means of proceeding against an alien already
physically in the United States, and the exclusion hearing is the usual means of proceeding against
an alien outside the United States seeking admission.”).
100. Bo Cooper, Procedures for Expedited Removal and Asylum Screening Under the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1501, 1502
(1997).
101. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b), 1226(a) (1994); Cooper, supra note 100, at 1502 (noting that
proceedings before an immigration court resemble “the classic common law adversarial model”).
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a “credible fear of persecution” in a screening interview before being
afforded a full hearing in immigration court.102
IIRIRA dramatically changed the procedures that govern the
inspection and removal of persons arriving at a United States port of
entry. Animating the Act were concerns among lawmakers and
immigration officials that the immigration system was crippled by
administrative backlogs and rife with abuses, including frivolous asylum
claims.103 IIRIRA was intended to promote efficiency, shore up the
southern border, and assuage national security concerns.104 As a 1996
House Judiciary Committee report explained, “[O]ur immigration laws
should enable the prompt admission of those who are entitled to be
admitted, the prompt exclusion or removal of those who are not so
entitled, and the clear distinction between these categories.”105
To that end, IIRIRA authorizes individual immigration officials to
remove two categories of “inadmissible aliens” without a hearing:
noncitizens who attempt to obtain admission to the United States by
means of fraud or material misrepresentation,106 and noncitizens who
lack valid entry documents.107 Persons may be expeditiously removed if
they present at a United States port of entry, such as an airport or a
border patrol station, and fall into one of these two categories.108
Additionally, expedited removal applies to individuals who are present
in the United States without having been admitted or paroled, are
apprehended within 100 miles of an international border, and cannot
prove that that they have been physically present in the United States for
the preceding fourteen days.109 In contrast to regular removal
102. An Overview of Asylum Policy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 107th Cong. 14 (2001) (statement of Karen Musalo, Hastings College of the Law).
103. See Cooper, supra note 100, at 1501.
104. See Lofgren, supra note 97, at 351–52 (describing the national media’s focus on
immigration fraud after the 1993 World Trade Center bombing).
105. H.R. REP. NO. 104-469, pt. 1, at 111 (1996).
106. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C) (2012) (deeming inadmissible “[a]ny alien who, by fraud or
willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured)
a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States”).
107. See id. § 1182(a)(7) (deeming inadmissible “any immigrant at the time of application for
admission who is not in possession of a valid unexpired immigrant visa, reentry permit, border
crossing identification card, or other valid entry document . . . and a valid unexpired passport”).
108. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(I)–(II). The statute grants the Attorney General the authority to
expand by regulation the scope of expedited removal to individuals apprehended inside the United
States without having been admitted or paroled who cannot establish that they have been
continuously present for two or more years.
109. See Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. 48,877, 48,878 (Aug. 11,
2004) (extending expedited removal provisions to persons apprehended within 100 miles of the
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proceedings under section 240 of the INA, expedited removal
proceedings are severely abbreviated. If an immigration officer
determines that a person satisfies the criteria for expedited removal, and
that person does not express intent to apply for asylum or fear of
persecution, then “the officer shall order the alien removed from the
United States without further hearing or review.”110
Given its summary nature, expedited removal places enormous
authority in the hands of frontline immigration officers. As immigration
advocates pointed out after IIRIRA was adopted, the expedited removal
invests in “relatively untrained” officials “a power previously given only
to highly trained immigration judges: to return people to the land from
which they came.”111 Indeed, in expedited removal proceedings CBP
officers “serve as both prosecutor and judge—often investigating,
charging, and making a decision all within the course of one day.”112
Even as it devolved the authority to remove noncitizens, IIRIRA
heightened the costs of removal for noncitizens. A person subjected to
expedited removal is barred from reentering the United States—even as
a visitor—for a period of five years.113 And a person previously ordered
expeditiously removed who seeks to enter the United States in violation
of the five-year bar is ineligible for most forms of relief under the INA,
including asylum.114 Expedited removal thus has serious long-term
consequences for people who may face persecution in their home
countries and seek to return to the United States in the future.115

southern border); Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Department of Homeland Security
Streamlines Removal Process Along Entire U.S. Border (Jan. 30, 2006), https://www.hsdl.org/
?view&did=476965 [https://perma.cc/SK59-UPHK] (announcing expansion of expedited removal
to apply to individuals apprehended within 100 miles of the northern border).
110. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i).
111. PHILLIP G. SCHRAG, A WELL-FOUNDED FEAR: THE CONGRESSIONAL BATTLE TO SAVE
POLITICAL ASYLUM IN AMERICA 196 (2000); see also Ramji, supra note 35, at 135 (“[P]otentially
life-threatening decisions are made by immigration officers, whose untrained judgments are
ineligible for review by any court or judicial body.”).
112. AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, REMOVAL WITHOUT RECOURSE: THE GROWTH OF SUMMARY
DEPORTATIONS FROM THE UNITED STATES 1 (2014), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/
sites/default/files/research h/removal_without_recourse.pdf [https://perma.cc/3LCS-62KP].
113. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i).
114. Id.
115. See, e.g., Stillman, supra note 18, at 37–38 (describing the experience of Elena, a Honduran
citizen who was subjected to expedited removal after receiving a negative credible fear
determination, was tortured in Honduras after being removed, and was barred from applying for
asylum because of the prior expedited removal order).
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The humanitarian criticisms of expedited removal came swiftly, and
two decades later show no signs of abating.116 Some observers and
human rights advocates have contended that expedited removal puts the
United States in violation of its statutory and international law
obligations; they insist that the system needs dramatic reform, if not
wholesale repeal.117 But today, it seems safe to say, expedited removal is
here to stay: Republican and Democratic administrations alike have
made expedited removal a centerpiece of their border enforcement
policies, and Congress has never seriously considered repealing the
regime.118 If the Trump administration’s 2017 executive actions are any
indication, expedited removal will become even more entrenched in the
coming years.119
Inherent to expedited removal is a “conflict between speedy decisionmaking and fair and accurate decision-making.”120 This tension is
especially evident in the limits IIRIRA imposes on judicial review of
expedited removal orders.
2.

A Noncitizen Ordered Expeditiously Removed Typically Lacks
Recourse to Administrative or Judicial Review

Expedited removal orders are effectively immune from administrative
and judicial review. IIRIRA bars the “administrative appeal” of an
expedited removal order, except where a person claims to have been
admitted for permanent residence, to already possess refuge or asylee

116. See, e.g., Pistone & Hoeffner, supra note 35, at 170–71 (describing early calls for
elimination of expedited removal); Manning, supra note 45 (reprising similar criticisms of
expedited removal in the context of present-day Central American migration).
117. See Pistone & Hoeffner, supra note 35, at 170 (“As early as 1999 . . . the Advisory
Committee on Religious Freedom Abroad, which reported to the Secretary of State and to the
President of the United States, called for the ‘[r]epeal of expedited removal,’ noting that repeal
‘should be a high priority.’”). Over fifty organizations, including Amnesty International, the
American Civil Liberties Union, and Human Rights Watch, joined the Lawyers Committee’s call
for repeal. Id. at 171 n.18 (discussing THE LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, IS THIS
AMERICA? THE DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS TO ASYLUM SEEKERS IN AMERICA, app. 4 (2000) (calling
for repeal of expedited removal)).
118. See, e.g., Hauslohner & Nakamura, supra note 67 (noting that the Obama administration
maintained the Bush administration’s expedited removal guidelines).
119. Id. (describing the Trump administration’s proposal to apply expedited removal to
noncitizens apprehended anywhere in the United States who cannot prove they have been present
for at least ninety days); see also Exec. Order 13,767, Border Security and Immigration
Enforcement Improvements, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793, 8796 (Jan. 30, 2017).
120. Pistone & Hoeffner, supra note 35, at 168 (stating that “the inherent conflict between speedy
decision-making and accurate and fair decision-making was well understood” when IIRIRA was
adopted).
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status, or to be a United States citizen.121 Similarly, federal courts lack
jurisdiction to review the merits of an expedited removal order,122 “any
other cause or claim arising from or relating to the implementation or
operation” of an expedited removal order,123 or “a decision by the
Attorney General to invoke the provisions” that activate expedited
removal.124 Accordingly, no court may issue relief in an action
pertaining to an expedited removal order.125
Moreover, IIRIRA largely strips Article III courts of jurisdiction of
habeas corpus proceedings that arise from expedited removal orders.
Federal courts may only exercise habeas review of an expedited removal
order to determine three distinct inquiries: whether the petitioner is a
noncitizen; whether the petitioner was ordered expeditiously removed;
and whether the petitioner possesses status as a lawful permanent
resident, refugee, or asylee.126 A court that adjudicates an expedited
removal-related habeas claim thus may consider whether an order was
issued against the petitioner; however, it lacks jurisdiction to ask if the
petitioner is actually inadmissible or merits a form of immigration
relief.127
Systemic challenges to expedited removal have floundered. Shortly
after IIRIRA took effect, the American Immigration Lawyers
Association timely filed an action challenging the regime’s legality and
constitutionality.128 On appeal, the D.C. Circuit found that the
Association and other immigrant rights organizations lacked third-party
standing to raise statutory or constitutional claims on behalf of persons

121. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(C) (2012).
122. Id. § 1252(a)(2)(A)(i).
123. Id.
124. Id. § 1252(a)(2)(A)(ii).
125. Id. § 1252(e)(1)(A). Nor may a court certify a class in a suit challenging expedited removal.
See id. § 1252(e)(1)(B).
126. Id. § 1252(e)(2).
127. See, e.g., Pena v. Lynch, 815 F.3d 452, 455 (9th Cir. 2015) (court lacked jurisdiction to
consider petition for review of expedited removal where petitioner did not raise any claim listed in
the statutory exceptions to the bar against judicial review); Brumme v. INS, 275 F.3d 443 (5th Cir.
2001) (under IIRIRA, judicial review of an expedited removal order following a person’s attempted
entry into United States is limited to whether an order has in fact been issued and whether petitioner
is the same person subject to the order); see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-828, at 220 (1996) (Conf. Rep.)
(“The habeas corpus proceeding shall not address whether the alien is actually admissible or entitled
to any relief from removal.”).
128. See Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass’n v. Reno, 199 F.3d 1352 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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subjected to expedited removal.129 Because IIRIRA requires that
challenges to its provisions be filed within sixty days of implementation,
the court’s decision to dismiss the Association’s suit cemented the
statutory framework that governs expedited removal.130
In subsequent years, advocates attempted to use habeas petitions as
vehicles to challenge the constitutionality of expedited removal,
particularly as it applies to asylum seekers.131 Most recently, in Castro v.
Department of Homeland Security,132 twenty-eight Central American
families who faced expedited removal filed habeas petitions in federal
district court.133 The plaintiffs, women and children who claimed to have
fled persecution in their home countries, received negative credible fear
determinations when they arrived in the United States.134 Citing
deficiencies in their credible fear interviews, the plaintiffs argued that
DHS had violated their Fifth Amendment procedural due process
rights.135 Additionally, the plaintiffs maintained that IIRIRA’s
jurisdiction-stripping provisions violate the Suspension Clause of the
United States Constitution.136 The Third Circuit affirmed the district
court’s decision to dismiss the plaintiffs’ action.137 It held that the court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction of the plaintiffs’ claims, and that the
protections of the Suspension Clause do not extend to noncitizens in
expedited removal proceedings.138 The fate of Castro and other habeas
129. Id. at 1363–64. According to the court, “It would be inconsistent with the ‘properly limited
role of the courts’ for us to use [the sixty-day deadline] provision as the basis for expanding
jurisdiction through the back door of third party standing.” Id. at 1364.
130. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3)(A)–(B); see H.R. REP. NO. 104-828, at 220 (“This limited provision
for judicial review does not extend to determinations of credible fear and removability in the case of
individual aliens, which are not reviewable.”).
131. See, e.g., Garcia de Rincon v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 539 F.3d 1133, 1140–42 (9th Cir.
2008) (court lacked jurisdiction over habeas petition collaterally attacking expedited removal order);
M.S.P.C. v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1165–66 (D.N.M. 2014) (IIRIRA’s
restrictions on habeas review did not violate Suspension Clause rights of petitioner, an asylum
seeker who received a negative credible fear determination and was ordered expeditiously
removed); Diaz Rodriguez v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., No. 14-CV-2716, 2014 WL 4675182, at
*3–4 (W.D. La. Sept. 18, 2014) (court lacked jurisdiction over habeas petition challenging
expedited removal order, even though petitioner alleged procedural and substantive deficiencies in
his credible fear interview).
132. 163 F. Supp. 3d 157 (E.D. Pa. 2016), aff’d, 835 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 2016), cert. denied, __
U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1581 (2017).
133. Id. at 158.
134. Castro, 835 F.3d at 428.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 429.
137. Id. at 425.
138. Id.
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challenges suggest that the statutory bases of the expedited removal
regime are impervious to judicial review, even when asylum seekers
claim that expedited removal would threaten their lives or liberty.139
D.

The Credible Fear Determination Process is Fraught with
Potential for Error

The asylum-seeking families at the center of Castro all claimed to
have escaped gang-related or sexual violence in the Northern
Triangle.140 Laura Flores-Pichinte fled with her young daughter after her
partner raped her and physically abused her and her daughter.141 Maria
Martinez Nolasco escaped after a gang leader sexually assaulted her and
threatened to kidnap her son in retaliation for her decision to reject his
advances.142 Lesly Griscelda Cruz Matamoros sought asylum with her
twelve-year-old daughter after gang members made sexual threats
against her daughter.143 Once in the United States, they and other
families with similar claims were deemed not to have credible fears of
persecution.144 In challenging their expedited removal orders, the Castro
families asserted that their credible fear interviews were infected by
official noncompliance and procedural errors.145 For example, the
families alleged that the asylum officers who conducted the interviews
failed to provide written explanations of their negative credible fear
determinations; rather, the officers “simply checked a box on a form
stating that the applicant did not meet a particular legal requirement,
without any explanation,” impeding the families’ ability to challenge the
officers’ conclusions.146 They also argued that asylum officers applied a
heightened standard for gauging credible fear, instead of the “significant
possibility” threshold mandated by statute.147

139. But see Gerald L. Neuman, The Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause after Boumediene v.
Bush, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 537, 577 (2010) (arguing that the statutory preclusion of judicial review
“of issues of law arising in expedited removal from the interior [of the United States] . . . violates
the Suspension Clause” (emphasis omitted)).
140. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11–12, Castro v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., __ U.S. __, 137
S. Ct. 1581 (2017) (No. 16-812).
141. Id. at 12.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 12–13.
145. Id. at 13.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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The Castro plaintiffs’ habeas claims alleged deficiencies in the
credible fear determination process that human rights advocates and
other observers have documented since expedited removal’s inception.
This section examines those deficiencies. It then discusses recent USCIS
guidance on credible fear interviews, which appears to elevate the
burden an asylum seeker must satisfy to avoid expedited removal.
1.

A Credible Fear Determination May Be Affected by Official
Noncompliance, Inadequate Interpretation, and the Absence of
Representation

As recent reports by the American Immigration Council, the U.S.
Commission on International Religious Freedom, and other
organizations demonstrate, the credible fear determination process
produces uneven and often arbitrary results.148 Two sets of factors
elevate the risk of error. First, frontline immigration officers fail to
comply consistently with safeguards designed to ensure that bona fide
asylum seekers are spared expedited removal.149 Second, circumstances
beyond asylum seekers’ control, including the absence of counsel and
the effects of trauma, disability, or untreated medical needs, may
compromise credible fear determinations.150
In some cases, CBP officers’ noncompliance with the requirements of
secondary inspections heightens the risk that asylum seekers will fail
their credible fear interviews.151 During the credible fear interview, the
asylum officer must take into account the consistency of the asylum
seeker’s statements with those made to CBP during secondary
inspection.152 A 2016 report by the U.S. Commission on International
Religious Freedom, a governmental entity tasked with studying the
impact of expedited removal on asylum seekers, documented numerous
148. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, AMERICAN EXILE: RAPID DEPORTATIONS THAT BYPASS
COURTROOM (2014), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/120214-expeditedremova
l_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/VH4F-VNUW] [hereinafter AMERICAN EXILE]; ELIZABETH CASSIDY &
TIFFANY LYNCH, U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, BARRIERS TO PROTECTION: THE
TREATMENT OF ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL (2016), http://www.uscirf.gov/sites/def
ault/files/Barriers%20To%20Protection.pdf [https://perma.cc/C8PJ-VMCE] [hereinafter USCIRF
2016 REPORT]; HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, HOW TO PROTECT REFUGEES AND PREVENT ABUSE AT THE
BORDER: BLUEPRINT FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT POLICY (2014), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/
sites/default/files/Asylum-on-the-Border-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/5A5U-YG5P] [hereinafter HOW
TO PROTECT REFUGEES]; SHEPHERD & BERNSTEIN MURRAY, supra note 34.
149. USCIRF 2016 REPORT, supra note 148, at 20–23.
150. SHEPHERD & BERNSTEIN MURRAY, supra note 34, at 8–22.
151. See AMERICAN EXILE, supra note 148, at 41.
152. See 2017 LESSON PLAN ON CREDIBLE FEAR, supra note 85, at 18–23.
THE
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cases in which CBP officers failed to record accurately asylum seekers’
answers to questions about their fears of persecution.153 In three of the
five credible fear interviews the Commission observed, “asylum seekers’
I-867 forms indicated ‘no’ answers to the fear questions in his or her
[border patrol] interview, but the asylum seeker said that s/he had
articulated a fear or was not asked.”154 Moreover, asylum seekers
reported that CBP officers “inquired into their fear claims in detail,
and/or dismissed assertions of fear,” failed to read asylum seekers’
statements back to them, and “pressured” asylum seekers to sign their
statements.155 One officer even told the Commission “he only reads back
the contents if the interviewee requests it because it takes too long.”156
Such noncompliance not only makes it more likely that an asylum seeker
will be removed without a credible fear interview, but also increases the
odds of an adverse credibility finding during the interview itself.157
Furthermore, the thoroughness and quality of credible fear interviews
vary dramatically between asylum officers and detention centers. The
family detention center in Artesia, New Mexico, which opened in June
2014, provides an illustrative example. Between September 2013 and
June 2014, approximately 77% of asylum seekers who underwent
credible fear interviews nationwide received positive determinations.158
In contrast, just 37.8% of the families detained in Artesia received
positive credible fear determinations in June and the first part of July
2014.159 Pro bono attorneys and other visitors to Artesia reported that
officials unevenly applied the substantive and procedural safeguards
intended to protect asylum seekers with potentially viable claims.160 As
one Human Rights First attorney explained, “I met with families,
including victims of domestic violence, who had cases that met the legal
standard for asylum, yet did not pass a credible fear screening.”161

153. USCIRF 2016 REPORT, supra note 148, at 21 (noting that CBP officers often recorded
identical, “clearly erroneous” answers during secondary inspection).
154. Id.
155. Id.; AMERICAN EXILE, supra note 148, at 39.
156. USCIRF 2016 REPORT, supra note 148, at 20 n.25.
157. See AMERICAN EXILE, supra note 148, at 41.
158. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., CREDIBLE FEAR WORKLOAD REPORT
SUMMARY: FY 2014, https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Outreach/Credible_Fear_and
_Reasonable_Fear_FY14_Q3.pdf [https://perma.cc/7XNU-8GZD].
159. Complaint at 31, M.S.P.C. v. Johnson, No. 1:14-cv-01437 (D.D.C. Aug. 22, 2014).
160. See Manning, supra note 45, Part III.
161. Lawsuit Challenges Credible Fear Process for Immigrant Families Held in Artesia
Detention Facility, HUM. RTS. FIRST (Aug. 22, 2014), https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/press-
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Asylum officers “misappl[ied] the [credible fear] standard,” neglected to
“prob[e] the asylum seeker for enough detail,” and “conduct[ed]
interviews with the asylum seeker’s minor children in the room.” 162
Similar problems have plagued credible fear interviews of women and
children held in the family detention center in Dilley, Texas.163
According to Shalyn Fluharty, managing attorney of the Dilley Pro Bono
Project, the strength and nature of an asylum seeker’s claim bear less on
the outcome of a credible fear interview than “the asylum officer [the
applicant] happen[s] to draw and the Asylum Office supervisor.”164
Additionally, immigration officials may fail to furnish adequate
interpretation services during the credible fear interview, contrary to the
regulations.165 Interpretation is typically provided through telephone or
video.166 The flaws of remote interpretation are well documented:
technological glitches impede communication and lead to erroneous
interpretation; telephonic interpreters are less likely to gain the trust of
the non-English-speaking party; and interpreters cannot see when a
speaker is confused or scared.167 Speakers of “rare” or indigenous
languages face especially high barriers to effective communication with
asylum officers.168 A DHS Advisory Committee recently concluded that
indigenous asylum seekers’ cases “are probably not receiving fair
processing” because DHS “systematically fails to provide appropriate

release/lawsuit-challenges-credible-fear-process-immigrant-families-held-artesia-detention
[https://perma.cc/BC2].
162. Id.
163. SHEPHERD & BERNSTEIN MURRAY, supra note 34.
164. Telephone Interview with Shalyn Fluharty, Managing Attorney, Dilley Pro Bono Project
(Jan. 8, 2018).
165. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(d)(5) (2017); DHS ADVISORY COMM. REPORT, supra note 5, at 96.
166. See DHS ADVISORY COMM. REPORT, supra note 5, at 95–97.
167. Id. at 97; Ingrid V. Eagly, Remote Adjudication in Immigration, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 933,
941 (2015).
168. Eagly, Shafer & Whalley, supra note 45, at 140. In Eagly, Shafer, and Whalley’s study on
family detention, “[f]amily detainees were . . . more likely to speak indigenous languages than the
rest of the detained population. In [their] family detention sample, 635 detainees (4% of the total)
spoke an indigenous Mexican, Central, or South American language.” Id. at 142. In 2013, the
Asylum Office began dispensing with credible fear determinations for rare language speakers for
whom interpretation could not be found within forty-eight hours, opting to serve such individuals
with a notice to appear in immigration court for section 240 removal proceedings. Id. at 141 n.193.
DHS has failed to implement that policy consistently, at least in the Dilley family detention center.
Telephone Interview with Shalyn Fluharty, supra note 164. Since late 2017, the Houston Asylum
Office has conducted numerous credible fear interviews of rare language speakers without adequate
interpretation. In one case, the Asylum Office attempted to interview an indigenous language
speaker no less than thirteen times before issuing a notice to appear. Id.
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language access” for such individuals.169 In one illustrative case, a
Guatemalan woman detained in Texas was interviewed in Spanish,
rather than her native indigenous language.170 “Her credible fear
interview notes demonstrated that the asylum officer understood a
particular event took place on ten occasions; but the woman maintains
she was referring to ten perpetrators. Before she could secure legal
counsel, she was removed.”171 In other cases involving speakers of
indigenous or rare languages, credible fear interviews have quite literally
“resemble[d] a game of telephone”: the asylum seeker communicates
telephonically with a speaker of the rare language, who then
communicates telephonically with a Spanish interpreter, who in turn
conveys telephonically the information to the asylum officer.172
Compounding these problems, asylum seekers rarely enjoy the benefit
of legal counsel before or during credible fear screenings.173 Like all
noncitizens in removal proceedings, asylum seekers have no right to
publicly funded legal counsel at any stage in the asylum application
process.174 Asylum seekers are subjected to mandatory detention
between secondary inspection and the credible fear interview, severely
impeding their ability to access representation.175 Barriers to
representation are acute in the family detention context. As Professor
Ingrid Eagly, Steven Shafer, and Jana Whalley show in their
forthcoming study on family detention, “[a]ll five family detention
centers used from 2001 to 2016 were located in small or rural cities, with
populations of only a few thousand” and limited social and legal
169. DHS ADVISORY COMM. REPORT, supra note 5, at 99, 79.
170. Brief of Refugee and Human Rights Organizations and Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support
of Petitioners at 15, Castro v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., __ U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1581 (2017) (No. 16812).
171. Id.
172. DHS ADVISORY COMM. REPORT, supra note 5, at 98. The barriers to fair processing faced
by speakers of rare languages are so high that the DHS Advisory Committee recommended that
such persons “should not be detained, but should rather be released with a Notice to Appear, on
their own recognizance or with the support of a case management support program.” Id. at 80.
173. See Eagly, Shafer & Whalley, supra note 45, at 131–36. Eagly, Shafer, and Whalley found
that just 23% of asylum seekers in family detention centers had legal representation during IJ review
of their negative credible or reasonable fear determinations. Id. at 134. Presumably, even fewer
asylum seekers, in both family and non-family detention, have legal counsel during the credible fear
interview itself. See also HOW TO PROTECT REFUGEES, supra note 148, at 8.
174. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2012); see also Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National
Study of Access to Counsel in Immigration Court, 164 U. PENN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2015) (“[I]mmigrants
have a right to counsel in immigration court, but not at the expense of the government.”).
175. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV) (asylum seekers “shall be detained pending a final
determination of credible fear of persecution and, if not found to have such a fear, until removed”);
8 C.F.R. § 235.3(c) (2017).
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services.176 Valiant pro bono efforts, such as the Artesia Project, the
CARA Pro Bono Project, and ALDEA, have expanded asylum-seeking
families’ access to legal advice in detention.177 But ICE and private
prison personnel have repeatedly encumbered legal representatives’
ability to consult with detained asylum seekers.178 And even in detention
centers with pro bono services, some asylum seekers enter their credible
fear interviews without having met with an attorney or attended legal
presentations on the asylum process.179
Absence of legal counsel matters; asylum seekers who do not
understand the purpose or nature of a credible fear interview, or
expedited removal generally, cannot be assumed to be aware of the
information an asylum officer would find helpful to assessing their
claims.180 CBP is required to give asylum seekers a form that explains
the credible fear process.181 This document is sure to be unintelligible to
an asylum seeker who does not read or write. And in some ports of
entry, the form may not be available in languages other than English or
Spanish.182 Unsurprisingly, according to the U.S. Commission on
176. Eagly, Shafer & Whalley, supra note 45, at 129.
177. See id. at 132–33; Manning, supra note 45 (describing the Artesia Project). The Dilley Pro
Bono Project, formerly the CARA Family Detention Pro Bono Project, serves protection-seeking
mothers and children detained in Dilley, Texas. The project began as a collaboration between the
Catholic Legal Immigration Network, the American Immigration Council, the Refugee and
Immigrant Center for Education and Legal Services, and the American Immigration Lawyers
Association. See Who, CARA PRO BONO PROJECT, http://caraprobono.org/partners/ [https://
perma.cc/NHQ4-UAR6]. ALDEA, a pro bono project based in Reading, Pennsylvania, serves
families detained in the Berks County Residential Center. See About Us, ALDEA—THE PEOPLE’S
JUST. CTR., https://aldeapjc.org [https://perma.cc/AJV4-MQWG].
178. Eagly, Shafer & Whalley, supra note 45, at 130–31; Complaint, Dilley Pro Bono Project v.
U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, No. 1-17-cv-01055 (D.D.C. Jun. 1, 2017) (challenging ICE’s
revocation of pro bono project legal assistant’s access to Dilley detention center); Letter from
CARA Pro Bono Project to Megan Mack & John Roth, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Sept. 30, 2015),
http://www.aila.org/advo-media/press-releases/2015/coercion-intimidation-detained-motherschildren/complaint-regarding-residential-center-in-dilley [https://perma.cc/7TY5-26DJ] (submitting
a “Complaint Regarding Coercion and Violations of the Right to Counsel at the South Texas Family
Residential Center in Dilley, Texas”).
179. See HOW TO PROTECT REFUGEES, supra note 148, at 8 (“Even [in detention centers] where
[legal orientation] presentations exist, asylum seekers are generally not provided with legal
presentations until after they have passed their credible fear interviews, and their cases are pending
before the immigration courts.” (emphasis in original)).
180. Asylum Hearing, supra note 27, at 134 (statement of Mary Meg McCarthy, Executive
Director, Heartland Alliance’s National Immigrant Justice Center) (“When individuals do not fully
understand the legal process or their rights, the CFI [credible fear interview] process is more likely
to erroneously exclude bona fide asylum seekers rather than permit entry to fraudulent applicants.”).
181. USIRF 2016 REPORT, supra note 148, at 50.
182. Id. (describing case in which French-speaking asylum seeker received credible fear
information in English).
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International Religious Freedom, “[o]ne overriding impression from [the
Commission’s] interviews of detained asylum seekers is their
insufficient understanding of what is happening to them in the Expedited
Removal process, and the fear, stress and uncertainty that this causes.”183
Such fear, stress, and uncertainty may be aggravated by the credible
fear interview itself. Asylum law is notoriously complex. Although
asylum officers are instructed to avoid legalese during interviews,
asylum seekers are not always asked to explain their fears in lay terms.
As one complaint, filed in 2014 on behalf of Central American mothers
and children detained in Artesia, documented, “mothers have been
asked, and are expected to be able to accurately answer, questions such
as, ‘Have you ever been harmed or threatened in El Salvador because
you belong to a group that is seen as different or special by society in
your home country?’ or ‘Are you a member of a particular social
group?’”184 One plaintiff, who had fled persecution by a criminal gang,
“thought that she was being asked whether she belonged to a group of
criminals or delinquents.”185 She received a negative credible fear
determination.186 This mother’s experience is not atypical among asylum
seekers who lack the benefit of counsel before the credible fear
interview.187
Whether or not they retain counsel, asylum seekers often confront an
additional barrier: the effects of trauma. Asylum seekers suffer from
post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, anxiety, and other
psychological conditions at rates significantly higher than the general
population.188 These conditions may undermine an asylum seeker’s
183. Id.
184. Complaint at 27, M.S.P.C. v. Johnson, No. 1:14-cv-01437 (D.D.C. Aug. 22, 2014). The
Artesia detention center closed in December 2014, and plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their
complaint on Jan. 30, 2015.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See id. at 27–28 (describing cases where asylum seekers received negative credible fear
determinations after being asked to explain their fears of persecution in legal terms); Wil S. Hylton,
The Shame of America’s Family Detention Camps, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 4, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/08/magazine/the-shame-of-americas-family-detention-camps.ht
ml?mcubz=0&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/6SEZ-U7H2] (documenting case where IJ affirmed negative
credible fear determination after the asylum seeker told him she did not belong to a particular
“social group”).
188. U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT: AN INTERNATIONAL
HANDBOOK TO GUIDE RECEPTION AND INTEGRATION 233 (2002), http://www.unhcr.org/
3d98623a4.html [https://perma.cc/723C-MBH2] (citing clinical studies that found rates of PTSD in
refugees ranged between 39% and 100%, compared to 1% for the general population); Letter from
CARA Pro Bono Project to Megan Mack & John Roth, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. 2 (Mar. 28, 2016),
http://www.aila.org/advo-media/press-releases/2016/cara-crcl-complaint-concerns-regarding-
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claim in multiple ways.189 First, people who have suffered severe
physical or psychological abuse or persecution may struggle to recount
their history in linear fashion, lessening their “credibility” in the view of
an asylum officer trained to evaluate a claim on the basis of the
interviewee’s consistency.190 Moreover, asylum seekers may fear
disclosing why they fled to the United States.191 Women escaping
gender-related violence, for example, often hesitate to tell male officials
about the abuse they have suffered.192 Such trauma may be exacerbated
by the “inhumane conditions” that asylum seekers experience in CBP
“holding cells” along the southern border, while awaiting transfer to
detention centers.193 According to one recent report, untreated medical
problems, including “physical manifestations of psychological
trauma . . . regularly inhibit detained mothers and children from fully
describing in their credible fear interviews their past experiences and
fears of future persecution.”194
detention [https://perma.cc/H5NH-GMQ4] [hereinafter CARA Project Complaint to DHS]
(complaint with respect to “Ongoing Concerns regarding the Detention and Fast-Track Removal of
Children and Mothers Experiencing Symptoms of Trauma”) (“[M]any detained families suffer from
Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), anxiety, depression, or other emotional or cognitive
disorders.”).
189. See SHEPHERD & BERNSTEIN MURRAY, supra note 34, at 9.
190. See, e.g., Derrick Silove, Zachary Steel & Charles Watters, Policies of Deterrence and the
Mental Health of Asylum Seekers, 284 JAMA 604, 605 (2000) (“Asylum seekers with symptoms of
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) or depression may experience psychological dissociation
under pressure and in such an altered state of awareness may fail to give appropriate answers.”);
JULIAN GOJER & ADAM ELLIS, POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER AND THE REFUGEE
DETERMINATION PROCESS IN CANADA: STARTING THE DISCOURSE 10 (2014), http://www.unhcr.
org/53356b349.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z3PQ-F56V] (“Recent studies have demonstrated that mental
health, including PTSD, can have an adverse effect on asylum seeker testimony and their ability to
develop and produce ‘credible’ legal/medical evidence.” (citation omitted)).
191. SHEPHERD & BERNSTEIN MURRAY, supra note 34, at 4. Shalyn Fluharty emphasizes the role
of trauma in negative credible fear determinations in the Dilley family detention center. Asylum
seekers who fail their credible fear interviews tend to “avoid [discussing] the most traumatic
incidents of harm” during their interviews, “which often are the incidents most important to their
case[s].” Telephone Interview with Shalyn Fluharty, supra note 164.
192. See SHEPHERD & BERNSTEIN MURRAY, supra note 34, at 4; Letter on Due Process
Violations, supra note 1, at 2.
193. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, IN THE FREEZER: ABUSIVE CONDITIONS FOR WOMEN AND
CHILDREN IN U.S. IMMIGRATION HOLDING CELLS 7 (2018), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/
report_pdf/uscrd0218_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/9CG5-X3X9] (noting that “[u]ndocumented
families taken into custody by US immigration agents at or near the US-Mexico border are
generally placed in holding cells for several hours to several days, and sometimes a week or more”).
The holding cells are often referred to as “hieleras (‘freezers’),” because they are “uncomfortably
cold.” Id. at 1–2. A 2015 “mental health assessment” found that “[t]ime in CBP holding cells” was
“the most difficult and traumatic period of detention for women and children.” Id. at 3 (quotation
marks omitted).
194. SHEPHERD & BERNSTEIN MURRAY, supra note 34, at 13.
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In sum, the protections built into the credible fear process do not
always function as they should. Official noncompliance during
secondary inspections increases the risk of adverse credibility findings
during the credible fear interview. Inadequate interpretation, lack of
legal counsel, and the effects of trauma may also foil an asylum seeker’s
credible fear determination.
2.

Recent USCIS Guidance on Credible Fear Interviews Appears to
Heighten the “Significant Possibility” Standard

By design, the credible fear interview is not a full-blown asylum
hearing. As the Department of Justice explained when expedited
removal took effect, “[t]he credible fear standard sets a low threshold of
proof of potential entitlement to asylum; many [noncitizens] who have
passed the credible fear standard will not ultimately be granted
asylum.”195 In recent years, however, asylum experts have argued that
new USCIS guidance has effectively elevated the threshold of proof
required to support a positive credible fear finding.196 Those criticisms
have centered on revisions to the Asylum Office’s credible fear lesson
plans, which train asylum officers to conduct credible fear interviews.197
In February 2014, citing an uptick in credible fear referrals, USCIS
issued a revised lesson plan on credible fear determinations.198 The
revisions included a new, three-part test that asylum officers must use
195. Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of
Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10,312, 10,320 (Mar. 6, 1997).
196. See, e.g., TAHIRIH JUSTICE CTR., SUMMARY OF FEBRUARY 13, 2017 ASYLUM DIVISION
LESSON PLAN IMPLEMENTING EXECUTIVE ORDERS: POSSIBLE IMPACTS ON SURVIVORS OF
DOMESTIC AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE 3 (2017), https://www.tahirih.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/
03/Tahirih-Summary-of-CFI-RFI-Changes-3.6.17.pdf [https://perma.cc/8KX7-LZZV] (describing
the 2017 lesson plan as “bring[ing] . . . initial screening interviews closer to becoming final
adjudications”); Memorandum from Bill Ong Hing to John Lafferty, Chief of USCIS Asylum Div. 2
(Apr. 21, 2014), http://static.squarespace.com/static/50b1609de4b054abacd5ab6c/t/53558353e4b02
071f74ee3c4/1398113107754/Response%20to%20USCIS%20Credible%20Fear%20Memo,%20Bill
%20Hing,%2004.21.2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/34F9-Q6WQ] [hereinafter Bill Ong Hing
Memorandum] (“The new credible fear standards are misleading[] and inappropriate.”); HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, “YOU DON’T HAVE RIGHTS HERE”: U.S. BORDER SCREENING AND RETURNS OF
CENTRAL AMERICANS TO RISK OF SERIOUS HARM (2014), https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/10/
16/you-dont-have-rights-here/us-border-screening-and-returns-central-americans-risk [https://perma
.cc/ZM8Q-ZSZA] (documenting fall in positive credible fear determinations after new credible fear
guidance was issued in February 2014).
197. See TAHIRIH JUSTICE CTR., supra note 196, at 1.
198. Memorandum from John Lafferty, Chief, USCIS Asylum Div., to Asylum Office Dirs. et al.
regarding Release of Updated Asylum Division Officer Training Course Lesson Plan, Credible Fear
of Persecution and Torture Determinations (Feb. 28, 2014), http://www.aila.org/infonet/uscisasylum-revised-credible-fear-lesson-plan [https://perma.cc/DL2J-LS24].
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when determining whether a person has a credible fear of persecution:
only where the asylum seeker’s testimony is “credible, persuasive,
and . . . specific” can the asylum officer find the “significant possibility”
standard satisfied.199 Moreover, departing from previous guidance, the
2014 lesson plan stated that the “significant possibility” standard for
gauging credible fear does not encompass claims determined to have a
“minimal or mere possibility, of success.”200 At the same time, the
revised lesson plan included a new, highly detailed section on asylum
case law.201 As Professor Bill Ong Hing noted, the lesson plan’s
attempted “overview of asylum law” not only failed clarify “important
variations in the law from federal circuit to federal circuit,” but also
erroneously suggested that the standard of proof for a positive credible
fear determination is equivalent to that required for a grant of asylum.202
In February 2017, in response to President Trump’s January 2017
executive order on border security, USCIS issued yet another updated
lesson plan on credible fear determinations.203 Strikingly, the 2017
lesson plan deleted preexisting instructions to asylum officers to find in
favor of an asylum seeker “[w]hen there is reasonable doubt regarding
the outcome of a credible fear determination.”204 Additionally, the new
lesson plan removed language that emphasized the preliminary nature of
the credible fear interview.205 Finally, the lesson plan directs asylum
officers to give more weight to “inconsistencies between the applicant’s
initial statement” to CBP during secondary inspection, stating that
“[s]uch inconsistencies may provide support for a negative credibility
finding . . . .”206 As explained above, the transcripts from border
199. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., ASYLUM DIVISION OFFICER TRAINING COURSE:
CREDIBLE FEAR 13–14 (2014), http://cmsny.org/wp-content/uploads/credible-fear-of-persecutionand-torture.pdf [https://perma.cc/S4UF-S5Z8].
200. Id. at 14.
201. Id. at 22–33.
202. Bill Ong Hing Memorandum, supra note 196, at 7–8.
203. Memorandum from John Lafferty, Chief, USCIS Asylum Div., to All Asylum Office
Personnel on Release of Updated Asylum Division Officer Training Course (ADOTC) Lesson Plans
(Feb. 13, 2017), https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B_6gbFPjVDoxY0FCczROOFZ4SVk/edit [https://
perma.cc/69VT-368R]; Tal Kopan, Trump Admin Quietly Made Asylum More Difficult in the U.S.,
CNN (Mar. 8, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/08/politics/trump-immigration-crackdown-asylu
m/index.html [https://perma.cc/K43L-JWH4].
204. TAHIRIH JUSTICE CTR., supra note 196, at 3 (quoting U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION
SERVS., ASYLUM DIV. OFFICER TRAINING COURSE: CREDIBLE FEAR 16 (Feb. 28, 2014), http://
cmsny.org/wp-content/uploads/credible-fear-of-persecution-and-torture.pdf [https://perma.cc/C4M8
-UFGK]).
205. Id.
206. 2017 LESSON PLAN ON CREDIBLE FEAR, supra note 85, at 21.
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interviews have been shown to be rife with inaccuracies, a factor the
lesson plan neglects to mention.207 The cumulative effect of these
changes, some observers argue, is a heightened credible fear standard.
Asylum experts have criticized the 2017 changes as “bring[ing] credible
fear screenings closer to full adjudications,”208 sending a message to
asylum officers to “be stricter,”209 and increasing the risk of erroneous
negative credible fear findings.210
Since releasing the 2017 lesson plan on credible fear determinations,
the Trump administration has expressly called for elevating the standard
of proof in credible fear interviews.211 Under an administration that
construes “asylum reform” as “expand[ing] the use of expedited
removal” and “return[ing] asylum seekers to safe third countries,”212
procedural safeguards in the credible fear determination process acquire
even greater importance. The next Part describes two such safeguards: IJ
review of negative credible fear determinations, and RFRs, whereby an
asylum seeker may receive a revised credible fear determination or a
second credible fear interview.
II.

IJ REVIEW AND RFRS: PROTECTIONS AGAINST
ERRONEOUS EXPEDITED REMOVAL

The credible fear interview process should be reformed to better
protect asylum seekers. More than twenty years after IIRIRA, however,
the system by which the government screens entering noncitizens is
deeply entrenched. And the current administration’s hostility to
immigrants and refugees renders meaningful reform of the credible fear
interview process a far-off goal.
Absent comprehensive reform, asylum seekers and their advocates
can invoke two administrative mechanisms to challenge negative

207. See infra text accompanying notes 151–57.
208. Reena Arya, USCIS Revises Protection Screening Lesson Plans, CATHOLIC LEGAL IMMIGR.
NETWORK, INC., https://cliniclegal.org/resources/uscis-revises-protection-screening-lesson-plans
[https://perma.cc/6G59-XXJA].
209. Kopan, supra note 203 (quoting former USCIS director León Rodríguez).
210. TAHIRIH JUSTICE CTR., supra note 196, at 4–5; Letter from Eleanor Acer, Senior Director of
Refugee Protection, Human Rights First, to Lori Scialabba, Acting Director of U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Servs. & John Lafferty, Asylum Div. (Mar. 10, 2017), http://www.humanrightsfirst.
org/sites/default/files/credible-fear-lesson-plan-letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/MRG8-N95N].
211. Attorney General Jeff Sessions, Remarks to the Executive Office for Immigration Review
(Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-delivers-remarks
-executive-office-immigration-review [https://perma.cc/YH6U-TUSU].
212. Id.
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credible fear determinations. The first permits an IJ to review a negative
credible fear determination in a truncated hearing. The second allows an
asylum seeker whose negative credible fear determination has been
affirmed by an IJ to submit an RFR to the asylum office. Each year
hundreds of negative credible fear determinations are reversed through
IJ review and RFRs.213 Some asylum seekers who have received positive
credible fear findings through these mechanisms have “textbook”
asylum cases.214 Others have claims that are less certain to succeed at the
merits phase.215
This Part examines the mechanics of IJ review and RFRs. It begins by
summarizing IJ review. It then explores the legislative and
administrative history of IJ review, the record on which IJ review is
based, and the role of counsel during IJ review. Next, this Part discusses
RFRs. It takes a close look at two aspects of the RFR process: the
burden of proof an asylum seeker must satisfy and stays of removal
pending consideration of RFRs.
A.

An Asylum Seeker Who Receives a Negative Credible Fear
Determination May Seek Review by an Immigration Judge

IIRIRA and its implementing regulations provide that an asylum
seeker who has received a negative credible fear determination may
request that an IJ “prompt[ly]” review that determination pending the
asylum seeker’s removal.216 If the IJ finds that the asylum seeker has a
credible fear of persecution or torture, the IJ must vacate the asylum
213. See infra Part III.
214. See Redacted Immigration Judge Complaint (Aug. 19, 2014), in Manning, supra note 45,
Part XI (noting that in the summer of 2014, volunteer lawyers affiliated with the American
Immigration Lawyers Association observed “several cases [in the Artesia detention center] where
an individual had been denied [credible fear] by both the asylum office and IJ, only to meet with
[an] attorney and find out there was a textbook asylum case”); Dara Lind, 9 Reasons Why Detaining
Immigrant Families Is Turning into a “Shitshow,” VOX (Aug. 14, 2014), https://www.vox.com/
2014/8/6/5971003/artesia-immigrants-detention-due-process-families-lawyers-asylum-court-border
[https://perma.cc/5P5F-CRDA] (detailing case of a lesbian woman from El Salvador who received a
negative credible fear determination, despite having what immigration attorney Laura Lichter called
“a textbook asylum claim,” and was granted a positive credible determination after a successful
RFR).
215. AM. IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASS’N, DUE PROCESS DENIED: CENTRAL AMERICANS
SEEKING ASYLUM AND LEGAL PROTECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 23 (2016), www.aila.org/File/
DownloadEmbeddedFile/68331 [https://perma.cc/6ZFG-ZMLF] (“Northern Triangle asylum
seekers remain at a distinct disadvantage in seeking protection form persecution because of the gaps
and inconsistencies in the interpretation of gang-related and gender-based asylum claims.”).
216. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III) (2012); 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.30(g)(2)(i), 1003.42,
1208.30(g)(2)(i) (2017).
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officer’s order and place the asylum seeker into section 240 removal
proceedings.217 If the IJ concurs with the asylum officer’s negative
credible fear finding, the asylum seeker is referred back to DHS and
processed for removal.218 An IJ’s findings on review are not subject to
appeal.219
On its face, IJ review is a straightforward procedure. When an asylum
seeker is found not to have a credible fear of persecution, the asylum
officer must ask whether the asylum seeker wishes to have an IJ review
the negative decision.220 An asylum seeker who answers affirmatively
will be detained and served with a notice of referral to an IJ; an asylum
seeker who refuses to either request or decline the review will be
considered to have requested it.221 IJ review must be conducted “as
expeditiously as possible,” ideally within twenty-four hours of, and no
later than seven days after, a negative credible fear determination.222 The
review itself must “include an opportunity for the alien to be heard and
questioned by the immigration judge,” either in person or through
telephone or video connection.223 The IJ is provided the written record of
the asylum officer’s credible fear determination, and, during the
proceeding, “may receive into evidence any oral or written statement
which is material and relevant to any issue in the review.”224 The
question of whether the asylum seeker has demonstrated a “significant
possibility” of prevailing on a claim of persecution is reviewed de
novo.225 Notably, asylum applicants must remain detained pending IJ
review.226
In sum, IJ review is neither a second credible fear interview nor a
merits hearing. Rather, it provides an administrative buffer—a second,
ostensibly neutral appraisal of an asylum seeker’s fear of returning
home—before expedited removal. In assessing the scope and nature of IJ

217. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.30(g)(2)(iv)(B).
218. Id. § 1208.30(g)(2)(iv)(A).
219. Id.
220. Id. § 208.30(g)(1).
221. Id. § 208.30(g)(1)(i).
222. 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III) (2012).
223. Id.
224. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.42(c).
225. Id. § 1003.42(d).
226. 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.42(g) (“An Immigration Judge shall have
no authority to review an alien’s custody status in the course of a review of an adverse credible fear
determination made by the Service.”).

16 - Shattuck.docx (Do Not Delete)

2018]

3/18/2018 9:00 PM

PREVENTING WRONGFUL EXPEDITED REMOVALS

493

review, it is instructive to examine its legislative and administrative
history.
1.

IJ Review Was Intended to Provide a Safety Net for Asylum Seekers
with Bona Fide Claims

IJ review evolved as a compromise measure in a Congress divided
between conservatives who wanted to tighten the credible fear screening
process and lawmakers keen on preserving protections for asylum
seekers. As IIRIRA took shape, refugee advocates urged members of
Congress to carve out procedural safeguards for asylum seekers who
faced the threat of expedited removal.227 Midway through the drafting
process, Senator Patrick Leahy introduced an amendment that, among
other protections, allowed asylum seekers who lost their credible fear
determinations to appeal to an IJ before being removed.228
The Leahy amendment responded to advocates’ fears that the new
requirement that asylum seekers demonstrate a “significant possibility”
of prevailing on their claims, coupled with the fast pace of expedited
removal, would put individuals with meritorious cases at risk of
removal.229 In debating the amendment, Senator Leahy and other
lawmakers argued that any system that denied asylum seekers with
negative credible fear findings “a chance to be heard before a judge”
would inevitably send some persecuted persons “back summarily to the
hands of [their] abusers.”230 Ultimately, the legislation that became
IIRIRA included a vague provision granting asylum seekers the right to
request IJ review after receiving a negative credible fear
determination.231 It also directed the DOJ to promulgate regulations
governing IJ review.232
The variant of IJ review enshrined in the final regulations was less
robust than some proponents of the Leahy amendment had proposed.

227. SCHRAG, supra note 111, at 197–99.
228. Id. at 158, 197.
229. Id. at 151, 157.
230. 142 CONG. REC. S4461 (daily ed. May 1, 1996) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (discussing
importance of administrative review in the context of the case of Fauziya Kasinga, an asylee who
fled Togo after being threatened with female genital cutting and whose claim was initially adjudged
not credible); id. at S4465 (statement of Sen. DeWine) (discussing ultimately successful asylum
case of an Indian national who would likely have been summarily excluded under expedited
removal).
231. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III) (2012).
232. Id. (“The Attorney General shall provide by regulation and upon the alien’s request for
prompt review by an immigration judge.”).
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Three aspects of the regulations deserve emphasis. First, during the
notice and comment period, immigration attorneys and scholars urged
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to adopt a
presumption in favor of IJ review following a negative credible fear
determination.233 As one commentary argued, “[r]eview should be
denied only if the alien affirmatively expresses a desire to abandon the
claim for asylum and accepts removal to the home country.”234 But the
INS expressly rejected that approach;235 the regulations provide that IJ
review occurs only if an asylum seeker requests it.236 Second, advocates
encouraged the INS to “favor in-person questioning by the IJ whenever
possible,” contending that telephonic or video hearings would compound
cultural and linguistic barriers.237 The regulations ultimately included no
such directive in favor of in-person review, however; they allow the IJ to
determine whether the hearing will be in person, or by telephone or
video.238 Finally, advocates expressed concern that while the interim
regulations allowed asylum seekers to “consult” with persons of their
choosing prior to the review, they failed to clarify whether counsel could
present issues to the IJ during the review itself.239 The final regulations
remain ambiguous as to the role of counsel during IJ review.240
A survey of the legislative and administrative history of IJ review
yields two conclusions. First, IJ review was undoubtedly intended to
provide a safety net to asylum seekers who, deprived of the safeguards
that predated IIRIRA, received negative credible fear determinations
despite having potentially meritorious claims.241 Expedited removal writ
large prioritizes speed; IJ review was designed to promote accuracy.242
Second, the version of IJ review that emerged in the DOJ’s
implementing regulations was far less vigorous than it could have

233. Michele R. Pistone & Philip G. Schrag, The 1996 Immigration Act: Asylum and Expedited
Removal—What the INS Should Do, 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1565, 1578 (1996).
234. Id.
235. See Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens;
Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10,312, 10,320 (Mar. 6, 1997)
(stating that “the language of [the legislation] clearly provides that the alien has the obligation to
request review of a negative credible fear determination”).
236. SCHRAG, supra note 111, at 202.
237. Pistone & Schrag, supra note 233, at 1578.
238. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.42(c) (2017).
239. SCHRAG, supra note 111, at 208.
240. Id.
241. Pistone & Schrag, supra note 233, at 1578.
242. SCHRAG, supra note 111, at 202.
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been.243 Shortly after IIRIRA took effect, one advocate painted a
disheartening picture of the potentially toothless nature of IJ review:
“[s]ome asylum seekers will be in a star-chamber proceeding where they
have no counsel present, no record to examine, and a judge and
interpreter which are faceless voices on the telephone.”244 That vision, it
turns out, is sometimes not far from the truth.245
2.

IJ Review Is Inconsistently Executed

For a process with so significant a function, IJ review has been the
subject of surprisingly little agency guidance.246 As a result, the scope of
IJ review differs between immigration courts and IJs.247 Two aspects of
IJ review are especially variable: the evidence an IJ may consider, and
the role of counsel before the immigration court.
An IJ has substantial discretion over the nature of the record when
conducting a review of a negative credible fear determination. The
asylum officer’s “written record of determination” from the credible fear
interview forms the basis of IJ review.248 That record consists of both the
asylum officer’s interview notes and “a summary of material facts as
stated by the applicant, such additional facts (if any) relied upon by the
officer, and the officer’s analysis of why, in light of such facts, the
[applicant] has not established a credible fear of persecution.”249
Additionally, under the regulations governing IJ review, an IJ “may
receive into evidence any oral or written statement which is material and
relevant to any issue in the review.”250 Practitioners report that IJs take
inconsistent approaches to the submission and consideration of evidence

243. Id.
244. Id. at 316 n.36 (quoting Letter from Martin A. Wenick, Hebrew Immigrant Aid Soc., to
Richard A. Sloane, Immigration & Nat’lity Serv. (Jul. 7, 1997)).
245. See, e.g., CARA Project Complaint to DHS, supra note 188, at 9–10 (describing case where
IJ affirmed the negative credible fear determination of an asylum seeker from El Salvador who was
unrepresented during IJ review, struggled to recount the rapes she had suffered, and was later
diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder).
246. See Katharine Ruhl & Christopher Strawn, Accessing Protection at the Border: Pointers on
Credible Fear and Reasonable Fear Interviews, in 2015 AILA IMMIGRATION PRACTICE POINTERS
741, 748 (2015), http://www.aila.org/File/Related/14072246a.pdf [https://perma.cc/H25L-AK2H]
(“Because appellate review is limited, there is scant guidance on the scope and nature of [IJ]
reviews.”).
247. Id.
248. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.42(a) (2017).
249. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(II) (2012); see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(g)(2)(ii).
250. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.42(c).

16 - Shattuck.docx (Do Not Delete)

3/18/2018 9:00 PM

496

[Vol. 93:459

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

that did not feature in the credible fear interview.251 Some IJs allow
asylum seekers to discuss facts not addressed during the credible fear
interview; others, however, “see their role on review as strictly appellate
in nature, and will only consider that which was submitted to the
[asylum officer] or referenced in the [asylum officer] referral.”252
The role of counsel during IJ review is another area of uncertainty.
The regulations make clear that an asylum seeker may consult with
counsel “prior to” the credible fear review, but are silent as to whether
an attorney may advocate on behalf of an asylum seeker during the
review itself.253 Just a few days before IIRIRA took effect, Chief
Immigration Judge Michael Creppy issued a memorandum to the
immigration courts that put forth a narrow reading of the role of
counsel.254 Although an asylum seeker may choose to consult with an
attorney before IJ review, he wrote, “there is no right to representation
prior to or during the review, either in the statute or the regulation.”255
The memorandum went on to expressly limit an attorney’s ability to
advocate during IJ review. “[N]othing in the statute, regulations or this
[memorandum],” Creppy stated, “entitles an attorney to make an
opening statement, call and question witnesses, cross examine, object to
written evidence, or make a closing argument.”256 That circumscribed
view of the role of counsel prevails today: the Immigration Court
Practice Manual’s section on credible fear reviews echoes the 1997
memorandum almost verbatim, granting IJs unfettered discretion to
allow or deny representation during the review.257

251. Ruhl & Strawn, supra note 246, at 748; see also SHEPHERD & BERNSTEIN MURRAY, supra
note 34, at 23.
252. Ruhl & Strawn, supra note 246, at 748 (“The best practice would be to consult with local
practitioners to learn your particular IJ’s approach.”); Telephone Interview Carol Anne Donohoe,
Attorney, ALDEA (Feb. 25, 2018) (noting that one IJ who appears remotely at the Berks family
detention center refuses to consider any information outside “the four corners” of the credible fear
interview).
253. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.42(c).
254. See INS Reports on the First Three Months of Implementation of Expedited Removal, 74
INTERPRETER RELEASES 1101, 1103 (1997).
255. Memorandum from Office of the Chief Immigration Judge to All Assistant Chief
Immigration Judges et al. (Mar. 25, 1997), at 10, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/
legacy/2013/05/07/97-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7S8-H6UM] (emphasis in original).
256. Id. at n.10; see also INS Reports on the First Three Months of Implementation of Expedited
Removal, supra note 254, at 1103 (noting that “Sen. [Edward] Kennedy urged the INS to amend the
regulations to specifically allow representation of asylum seekers” during IJ review).
257. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, IMMIGRATION COURT
PRACTICE MANUAL 125 (2017), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pages/attachments/2017/
11/02/practicemanual.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7S8-H6UM].
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Practitioners who have advocated for a broader role for counsel
during IJ review have encountered considerable resistance. Pro bono
attorneys in family detention centers report that some IJs have refused to
allow them to participate in credible fear reviews, even if they have
entered an appearance with the immigration court.258 One administrative
complaint, filed from Artesia in August 2014, documents a credible fear
review in which the IJ informed the attorney that she had “no role” in the
proceeding and refused to answer the attorney’s purely procedural
questions.259 In the family detention center in Dilley, Texas, “[t]he
detainee’s attorney is generally not permitted to speak during the IJ
Review or present a theory of the case, case law, or arguments,” but
rather “is limited to submitting a declaration and supporting
documents . . . that may corroborate the applicant’s testimony.”260
Moreover, pro bono attorneys in family detention centers are typically
not notified of IJ review hearings until the day before the hearing,
leaving “only a few hours to prepare numerous families for a hearing
that could result in their deportation.”261 In some cases, attorneys are not
notified at all.262 “Consequently, some noncitizens are unable to consult
with counsel or other individuals until after the IJ has upheld a negative
credible fear determination.”263
EOIR has balked at carving out a greater role for counsel during IJ
reviews of negative credible fear determinations. The American
Immigration Lawyers Association has pointed out that the regulations do
not preclude representation during IJ review and has asked EOIR to
consider amending the Immigration Court Practice Manual to require IJs
to allow counsel to assume a participatory role.264 To date, EOIR has

258. See Redacted Immigration Judge Complaint (Aug. 19, 2014), in Manning, supra note 45,
Part XI (describing case where IJ confirmed receipt of an attorney’s notice of entry of appearance in
immigration court, only to prohibit attorney from participating in the negative credible fear review
of attorney’s client); SHEPHERD & BERNSTEIN MURRAY, supra note 34, at 23.
259. Redacted Immigration Judge Complaint (Aug. 19, 2014), in Manning, supra note 45, Part
XI.
260. SHEPHERD & BERNSTEIN MURRAY, supra note 34, at 23; see CARA Project Complaint to
DHS, supra note 188, at 5–13 (documenting multiple cases in Dilley detention center where IJs
refused to allow counsel to participate in IJ reviews of negative credible fear determinations).
261. SHEPHERD & BERNSTEIN MURRAY, supra note 34, at 23.
262. Id.
263. Brief for Refugee and Human Rights Organizations and Scholars as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners at 18, Castro v. Dep’t of Homeland Security, __ U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1581
(2017) (No. 16-812) (emphasis in original).
264. Meeting Agenda and Minutes, Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass’n & Office of the Chief
Admin. Hearing Officer (Oct. 22, 2015), at 7, https://web.archive.org/web/20170429161921/https://
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declined: it insists that IJs comply with the regulations as long as they
allow asylum seekers to “consult” with persons of their choosing before
the credible fear review.265
The case of Melina,266 a detained asylum seeker from Guatemala,
illustrates IJ review in its most perfunctory form. 267 When Melina was
fourteen, she was kidnapped and raped by a well-known drugtrafficker.268 A few years later, after again encountering her attacker, she
fled Guatemala with her one-year-old son.269 An asylum officer
concluded that Melina did not have a credible fear of persecution, and
she was ordered removed.270 With the help of an attorney, Melina
requested IJ review.271 Citing the Immigration Court Practice Manual,
the IJ barred Melina’s attorney from participating in the review and did
allow Melina to explain why she had struggled to tell her story during
the credible fear interview.272 The IJ affirmed Melina’s negative credible
fear determination.273
Melina and her counsel then requested that the Houston Asylum
Office reconsider her negative credible fear determination.274 They
included in her RFR a psychological evaluation that diagnosed Melina
with posttraumatic stress disorder and emphasized the barriers she faced
to fully recounting her history of persecution.275 The Asylum Office
granted Melina’s RFR.276 After a second credible fear interview, Melina
and her son were found to have credible fears of persecution, placed into
section 240 removal proceedings, and released from detention.277 The
next section sketches the procedures and uncertainties involved in the
RFRs that Melina and hundreds of other asylum seekers have submitted
to USCIS in recent years.

www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pages/attachments/2016/03/30/eoir_aila_fall_2015_minutes.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A44F-XJZ7].
265. Id.
266. Melina is a pseudonym. See CARA Project Complaint to DHS, supra note 188, at 4 n.11, 10.
267. Id. at 10.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 11.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 10–11.
276. Id. at 11.
277. Id.
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An Asylum Seeker May Request Reconsideration of a Negative
Credible Fear Determination Before Removal

In December 1997, the Executive Associate Commissioner for Field
Operations of the INS278 issued a memorandum (1997 memorandum) to
immigration officials tasked with enforcing expedited removal.279 At the
time, expedited removal was just eight months old. The memorandum,
which clarified “policy questions, procedural and logistical problems,
and qualify assurance concerns,” included a paragraph on the “reinterview of individuals” prior to removal from the United States.280
“[A]t its discretion,” the memorandum stated, the government may
“offer a second credible fear interview to any alien even if the alien has
not established a credible fear before an asylum officer or after
immigration judge review.”281 The memorandum provided a standard for
adjudicating requests for a second credible fear interview.282 It also
directed officials to refrain from removing individuals with outstanding
requests for a re-interviews.283
Two decades later, the 1997 memorandum remains the only publicly
available agency guidance on RFRs. Although the memorandum still
informs advocacy on behalf of asylum seekers, its directives often seem
at odds with the government’s on-the-ground practices in RFR
adjudications. This section discusses the current state of the RFR
process. It begins by examining the regulatory framework surrounding
RFRs. It then sheds light on two aspects of RFRs that have prompted
confusion and frustration among immigration attorneys. First, it asks
whether the burden of proof an asylum seeker must satisfy for USCIS to
grant an RFR has evolved since the 1997 guidance was issued. Second,
it examines whether DHS must stay an asylum seeker’s expedited
removal pending the adjudication of an RFR.284

278. In March 2003, the functions of the INS were distributed to three divisions within the newly
created Department of Homeland Security: United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS), United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and United States Customs
and Border Protection (CBP). See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat.
2135.
279. See Expedited Removal Policy Guidance, supra note 39, at 1.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. See infra sections II.B.2–3.
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The RFR Process Is Largely Uncodified

RFRs are tethered to a single regulation: 8 C.F.R. section
1208.30(g)(2)(iv)(A), which provides that USCIS “may reconsider a
negative credible fear finding that has been concurred upon by an
immigration judge after providing notice of its reconsideration to the
immigration judge.”285 Alongside the 1997 memorandum, this regulation
supplies the official basis of a process by which asylum seekers who
have received negative credible fear determinations may try to avoid
expedited removal and enter section 240 removal proceedings. After a
negative credible fear finding, an asylum seeker may submit an RFR to
the regional Asylum Office that conducted the asylum seeker’s initial
interview.286 If the RFR is approved, the asylum seeker is granted a
second interview, or, in some cases, a positive credible fear
determination.287 If the RFR is denied, the asylum seeker is processed
for expedited removal.288
Like IJ review of negative credible fear determinations, the RFR
process remains largely uncodified.289 The regulation makes no mention
of a standard that should inform USCIS’s decision to grant or deny an
RFR, the materials on which the asylum officer may base that decision,
and the degree of deference, if any, to be afforded the IJ’s affirmance of
the initial negative credible fear determination.290 Because an asylum
seeker cannot appeal an adverse RFR, there is little agency guidance on
the criteria that control RFR adjudication.291 As a result, in at least some

285. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.30(g)(2)(iv)(A) (2017).
286. Dree K. Collopy, Crisis at the Border, Part II: Demonstrating a Credible Fear of
Persecution or Torture, 16-04 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1 (2016); Ruhl & Strawn, supra note 246, at 748.
287. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.30(g)(2)(iv)(A).
288. The regulations do not expressly state that an individual whose RFR has been denied is
processed for expedited removal; however, hasty removal appears to be implied by the regulations.
Cf. id. (stating that when an IJ affirms a negative credible fear determination, “the case shall be
returned to the Service for removal of the alien”). Anecdotal evidence suggests that persons whose
RFRs are denied are often hastily removed. See, e.g., Ernie Collette, #Dilley Dispatches: From
Hope to Heartbreak in Forty-Eight Hours, LAW MARGINS (Dec. 14, 2016), http://lawatthe
margins.com/dilleydispatches-hope-heartbreak-forty-eight-hours/ [https://perma.cc/L6ZN-K8EN]
(describing case where USCIS denied an RFR and ICE removed the asylum seeker within a matter
of hours); Letter on Due Process Violations, supra note 1, at 5 (describing case where USCIS
denied an RFR and ICE removed the asylum seeker less than twenty-four hours later).
289. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.30(g)(2)(iv)(A) (lacking guidance on the standard of review during, and
the procedures involved in, RFRs).
290. Id.
291. See Ruhl & Strawn, supra note 246, at 748.
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detention centers, the procedures that govern RFRs are variable,
personnel-contingent, and susceptible to arbitrary application.292
2.

An Asylum Seeker Bears the Burden of Proof in an RFR

The 1997 memorandum directs the Asylum Office to grant an RFR
where the asylum seeker has “made a reasonable claim” that
“compelling new information concerning the case” will come to light
during reconsideration.293 USCIS has issued no public guidance that
modifies that standard. Yet practitioners who represent detained families
report that USCIS often denies RFRs filed on behalf of asylum seekers
whose fears of persecution were not fully disclosed or probed during the
credible fear interview.294
For example, in late 2015, USCIS abruptly adopted what appeared to
be a heightened standard for adjudicating the RFRs of women and
children detained in the two family detention centers in Texas.295
According to pro bono lawyers, the Houston Asylum Office began
granting RFRs only where asylum seekers could demonstrate that
“egregious circumstances” informed their negative fear determination.296
Data collected by the CARA Pro Bono Project showed a precipitous
drop in RFR grants at the Dilley detention center; in the weeks after
October 23, 2015, the denial rate “jumped from 23% to 66%.”297 At the
same time, advocates observed, the Asylum Office accelerated RFR
adjudications. “Whereas USCIS previously took a week or more,”
attorneys noted in December 2015, “the Houston Asylum Office now
issues a decision on a request for reconsideration within twenty-four to
forty-eight hours, and sometimes on the same day that the request was
submitted.”298
The increase in RFR denials coincided with litigation that challenged
the prolonged detention of asylum-seeking families.299 In July 2015, a

292. Telephone Interview with Carol Anne Donohoe, Attorney, ALDEA (Feb. 25, 2018)
(commenting on cases out of the Berks County Residential Center); Telephone Interview with
Shalyn Fluharty, supra note 164 (commenting on cases out of the South Texas Family Residential
Center); Letter on Due Process Violations, supra note 1, at 2–5.
293. Expedited Removal Policy Guidance, supra note 39, at 1.
294. Telephone Interview with Shalyn Fluharty, supra note 164.
295. See Letter on Due Process Violations, supra note 1, at 3.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 3–4.
298. Id. at 4.
299. Id. at 1.
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federal district court judge ruled in Flores v. Johnson300 that DHS’s “norelease” policy—under which asylum-seeking families were detained for
the duration of their cases—violated the Flores settlement of 1997.301
That settlement requires the government to release children from
immigration custody “without unnecessary delay.”302 While the
government’s appeal of the district court ruling was pending, DHS was
under pressure to rapidly process families that included children.303
Heightening the RFR threshold may have helped DHS reduce the
average detention-times of family units and profess compliance with the
Flores settlement.304
Advocates raised the apparent policy shift with federal agency heads,
to no avail. In December 2015, a coalition of immigrant rights
organizations—the American Immigration Lawyers Association, Human
Rights First, the Catholic Legal Immigration Network, and the American
Immigration Council—published an open letter to the directors of
USCIS and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).305 Among
other concerns, the letter documented numerous cases in which
apparently meritorious RFRs had been denied, “le[ading] to the removal
of families with viable claims for protection.”306
Around the same time, the two dozen Central American families who
would bring habeas challenges in Castro v. Department of Homeland
Security307 were fighting to remain in the United States to seek
asylum.308 After IJs affirmed their negative credible fear determinations,
many of the Castro families submitted RFRs to the Asylum Office.309 In

300. 212 F. Supp. 3d 864 (C.D. Cal. 2015).
301. Id. at 886–87.
302. See Stipulated Settlement Agreement, Flores v. Reno, No. CV-85-4544-RJK(Px) (C.D. Cal.
1997).
303. See Flores v. Lynch, 212 F. Supp. 3d 907, 916–17 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (ordering DHS to
release detained immigrant children and their parents “without unnecessary delay”); Letter on Due
Process Violations, supra note 1, at 4.
304. Letter on Due Process Violations, supra note 1, at 4.
305. Id. at 2–5.
306. Id. at 2.
307. 163 F. Supp. 3d 157 (E.D. Pa. 2016), aff’d, 835 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 2016), cert. denied, __
U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1581 (2017).
308. See Castro, 835 F.3d at 427 (noting that petitioners sought “refuge” in the United States
“over a period of several months in late 2015”).
309. Telephone Interview with Carol Anne Donohoe, supra note 292; see also Bryan Johnson,
DHS’ Massive Fraud on Family Detention, AMOACHI & JOHNSON (June 14, 2016),
https://amjolaw.com/2016/06/14/dhs-massive-fraud-on-family-detention/ [https://perma.cc/B4VS-7
GUB] (displaying government data that shows denial of several RFRs filed by Castro families).
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some cases, single families filed multiple RFRs.310 Attorneys vigorously
argued that the families satisfied the credible fear threshold.311 They also
alleged that asylum officers had committed serious procedural and
substantive errors during the families’ credible fear interviews.312 But in
case after case, the families’ RFRs—uniformly meritorious, according to
their advocates—were denied.313
Whether or not USCIS has officially sanctioned a harder line on
RFRs, practitioners in family detention centers have had little success
when invoking the “compelling new information” standard outlined in
the 1997 memorandum.314 According to Fluharty, the Houston Asylum
Office tends to grant RFRs only where the applicant can show that the
credible fear interview was undermined by gross procedural deficiencies
or official error.315 In contrast, the Asylum Office often denies RFRs
where asylum seekers seek to disclose information not discussed during
credible fear interviews, even when that information would support
cognizable asylum claims.316 Attorneys in Dilley and Karnes
hypothesize that the Houston Asylum Office has adopted a de-facto
presumption against the credibility of persons who submit such RFRs.317
They also surmise that when adjudicating RFRs, the Asylum Office
applies Fifth Circuit asylum precedent, which is hostile to claims that
might succeed in other circuits.318 Similarly, the Newark Asylum Office,
which adjudicates RFRs out of the Berks family detention center, has
suggested in recent years that it gives more weight to RFRs that are
based on egregious official errors than those that involve new
information.319 But, one attorney notes, RFR adjudications are opaque
and unpredictable, even when representatives make a strong case that an
official made a mistake.320
310. Telephone Interview with Carol Anne Donohoe, supra note 292.
311. Id.
312. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13, Castro v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., __ U.S. __, 137
S. Ct. 1581 (2017) (No. 16-812).
313. Telephone Interview with Carol Anne Donohoe, supra note 292; Johnson, supra note 309
(displaying government data that shows denial of several RFRs filed by Castro families).
314. Telephone Interview with Shalyn Fluharty, supra note 164.
315. Id. (“We’ve found the compelling new information [standard] to not be particularly
persuasive unless . . . the asylum officer screwed up” or the interview suffered from “some sort of
procedural flaw that was not the fault of the applicant.”).
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Telephone Interview with Carol Anne Donohoe, supra note 292.
320. Id. (describing RFR adjudications as “a crapshoot”).
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In any event, detained families who submit RFRs bear onerous and
inconsistent burdens of proof. Pro bono attorneys in Dilley and Karnes
often include in RFRs psychological evaluations that corroborate
applicants’ claims and explain what went wrong in the credible fear
interview.321 But in many cases, such evidence seems not to carry
enough weight with USCIS to overcome the apparent presumption
against the credibility of an asylum seeker who produces new or
additional information at the RFR phase.322 Just as the outcome of a
credible fear interview may hinge on the asylum officer an applicant
happens to draw, the outcome of an RFR is largely contingent on the
Asylum Office supervisor who reviews the request—no matter how
compelling an applicant’s claim for relief.323
3.

In Theory, RFRs Should Stay Expedited Removal Orders

According to publicly available DHS guidance, ICE must stay an
expedited removal order if an asylum seeker has a pending RFR.324 The
1997 memorandum expressly instructs immigration officials to refrain
from executing an expedited removal order in a case where an RFR has
yet to decided: officers “should cooperate by continuing to detain [a
noncitizen who has submitted a request for reconsideration] until the
second adjudication, and potentially also a second review by the
immigration judge is completed.”325 In recent years, DHS
communications have reiterated that policy. An internal ICE policy
document from 2014, unearthed through Freedom of Information Act
requests, directed officials at the Artesia family detention center to stay
the removal of asylum seekers who submitted RFRs until the Asylum
Office adjudicated the requests.326 Likewise, a 2015 DHS training
manual for supervisors at the Houston Asylum Office suggested that ICE
321. Telephone Interview with Shalyn Fluharty, supra note 164; see CARA Project Complaint to
DHS, supra note 188, at 5–13 (documenting multiple cases in which RFRs included professional
psychological evaluations).
322. CARA Project Complaint to DHS, supra note 188, at 5–13.
323. Id.
324. Expedited Removal Policy Guidance, supra note 39, at 1.
325. Id.
326. See AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, ARTESIA FOIA HIGHLIGHTS 2 (2016) https://www.ameri
canimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/foia_documents/artesia_highlights.pdf [https://perma.
cc/AA2N-2YAF] (citing Artesia ICE Office of Chief Counsel Procedures of Oct. 31, 2014)
(instructing ICE Deputy Chief Counsel to remind ICE officers that DHS “has agreed to place a ‘Z’
hold [staying removal] on residents [with pending RFRs] until the [Artesia Family Residential
Center Asylum Pre-Screening Officer] provides notice of his/her decision to accept or deny the
motion for reconsideration”).
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was supposed to verify that the persons it removed from the Karnes
family detention center did not have pending RFRs.327
On-the-ground practices have not always faithfully reflected that
guidance, however. Since 2014, advocates have documented several
cases in which DHS removed families who were awaiting re-interviews
or had pending RFRs.328 DHS itself has acknowledged as much: in
December 2015, ICE Chief Counsel at the Dilley family detention center
informed pro bono attorneys that ICE would no longer honor its
“gentlemen’s agreement” to stay the removal of families with
outstanding RFRs.329 That abrupt departure underscores the slippery and
uncertain nature of RFRs generally; the “gentlemen’s agreements” that
shape RFR protocols are malleable, untethered to precise regulatory
commands, and revocable at ICE’s discretion.
In sum, RFRs are by no means a cure-all for the ills of flawed
credible fear determinations and IJ reviews. Advocates for detained
families have attempted to shape consistent, formal reconsideration
protocols.330 But DHS officials have at times disregarded mutually
agreed-upon rules,331 and have apparently adopted a heightened standard
for granting RFRs.332 As a result, the RFR process is circumscribed and
personnel-specific.333 Such a hole-riddled safety net will inevitably fail
to catch asylum seekers who during the credible fear interview do not
disclose details pertinent to their claims—whether because of disability,
language barriers, or other factors.334
III. DESPITE THEIR FLAWS, IJ REVIEW AND RFRS HELP
PREVENT THE ERRONEOUS REMOVAL OF ASYLUM
SEEKERS
On June 24, 2014, DHS opened an immigration detention center in
the town of Artesia, New Mexico.335 Improvised and isolated, the
detention center consisted of corrugated steel trailers on a federal law
327. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., SOPS FOR ZHN TEAM TDY TO KARNES 19 (2015), https://www.
uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/About%20Us/Electronic%20Reading%20Room/Policies_and_
Manuals/Credible_Fear_Guidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/V6XL-GN3C].
328. Letter on Due Process Violations, supra note 1, at 10.
329. Id.
330. See id. at 2–12; CARA Project Complaint to DHS, supra note 188, at 4–15.
331. See Letter on Due Process Violations, supra note 1, at 2–12.
332. Telephone Interview with Shalyn Fluharty, supra note 164.
333. See supra section II.B.
334. See Letter on Due Process Violations, supra note 1, at 2–12.
335. DHS ADVISORY COMM. REPORT, supra note 5, at 150.
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enforcement training campus.336 There the Obama administration moved
DHS’s expedited removal machinery into high gear.337 “We have
already added resources to expedite the removal, without a hearing
before an immigration judge, of adults who come from [El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras] without children,” DHS Secretary Jeh
Johnson told a Senate committee in July 2014.338 “Artesia is one of
several facilities that DHS will use to increase our capacity to hold and
expedite the removal of the increasing number of adults with children
illegally crossing the southwest border.”339
The detention center soon became a 700-bed “deportation center” for
hundreds of Central American women and children.340 Positive credible
fear rates in Artesia were grossly disproportionate to the national
average.341 In the nine months before June 2014, approximately 77% of
asylum seekers passed their credible fear interviews.342 In contrast, just
37.8% of the families detained in Artesia were deemed to have a
credible fear of persecution during the first seven weeks of the facility’s
existence.343 During that period, DHS removed more than 200 women
and children to Central America.344
As the weeks passed, volunteer lawyers mobilized in Artesia.345
Between late July and December 2014, teams averaging fourteen
lawyers per day provided pro bono assistance to detained families.346
They consulted with mothers before their credible fear interviews,
helped families obtain release on bond, and provided representation in

336. Taylor & Johnson, supra note 45, at 192–93. El Paso, the closest major city, is more than
200 miles away from Artesia.
337. Surge Hearing, supra note 59, at 14.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 15.
340. Manning, supra note 45, at Part III; see also Cindy Carcamo, U.S. Sends First Planeload of
Moms, Children Back to Honduras, L.A. TIMES (July 14, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/world/
mexico-americas/la-fg-honduras-deportees-20140714-story.html#page=1 [https://perma.cc/89UW-Z
422].
341. Manning, supra note 45, at Part III.
342. Credible Fear Workload Report Summary: FY 2014, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS.,
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Outreach/Credible_Fear_and_Reasonable_Fear_FY
14_Q3.pdf [https://perma.cc/WSR5-LPWD].
343. Complaint at 31, M.S.P.C. v. Johnson, No. 1:14-cv-01437 (D.D.C. Aug. 22, 2014).
344. Hylton, supra note 187.
345. Manning, supra note 45, at Part V.
346. Id. at Part IX.
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immigration court.347 Within one month, the removal rate in Artesia had
fallen by 80%, and within two months, by 97%.348
Central to the lawyers’ efforts were their successful challenges to
families’ negative credible fear determinations. With help from remote
legal teams, lawyers in Artesia helped mothers request that IJs review
their negative credible fear determinations, and represented them during
those reviews.349 They also submitted RFRs to USCIS, requesting that
the Asylum Office reverse negative credible fear determinations or grant
asylum seekers new interviews.350 Between July and October 2014,
volunteer attorneys submitted at least twenty-four RFRs to USCIS on
behalf of families detained in Artesia.351 Twenty of those requests
resulted in positive credible fear determinations.352
This Part examines government data on negative credible fear
determinations vacated through IJ review and RFRs, focusing on family
detention cases. The data, obtained through Freedom of Information Act
requests, reflect outcomes in family detention centers from 2014 to 2016
in Artesia, New Mexico (now closed); Dilley, Texas; Karnes City,
Texas; and Berks, Pennsylvania.353 The data suggest that despite their
shortcomings, IJ review and RFRs have prevented the erroneous
removal of hundreds of asylum-seeking families.

347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id.; Victor Nieblas Pradis, Artesia: A Day in the Tour of Duty, Part I, THINK IMMIGR. (Oct.
27, 2014), http://thinkimmigration.org/blog/2014/10/27/artesia-a-day-in-the-tour-of-duty-part-1
[https://perma.cc/74MW-AXQ6].
350. Id.; see also Letter from Stephen W. Manning, AILA-Coordinated Pro Bono Project Artesia,
to the Houston Asylum Office, Request for Review of a Negative Credible Fear Determination (July
2014), https://innovationlawlab.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Asylum-Office-Motion-Reconsi
der_Redacted.pdf [https://perma.cc/T6PR-7QNZ] (sample RFR).
351. See USCIS Asylum Div., Artesia, Karnes, National Stats, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR.
SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Outreach/PED_Artesia_and_Karnes_Upda
tes_Through_October_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/XXU8-2WXV].
352. Id.
353. This section relies on raw data obtained from EOIR through a Freedom of Information Act
request that the law firm Amoachi & Johnson, PLLC, submitted in 2016. Both the FOIA request and
the data are available on the firm’s website. See EOIR Response Letter and Original Data on Family
Detention Immigration Judge Credible Fear Reviews, AMOACHI & JOHNSON, https://amjolaw.com/
category/vault/page/3/ [https://perma.cc/36XY-K6EQ] [hereinafter EOIR Data]. This section also
incorporates and cites data from the original study on family detention discussed by Eagly, Shafer &
Whalley, supra note 45.

16 - Shattuck.docx (Do Not Delete)

3/18/2018 9:00 PM

508

[Vol. 93:459

A.

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

IJ Review Can Be a Meaningful Corrective to Erroneous Credible
Fear Determinations

In recent years, IJs have reversed thousands of negative credible fear
determinations in cases involving families and individuals. Year on year,
IJs have both conducted increasing numbers of negative credible fear
reviews and reversed DHS’s negative fear findings at progressively
higher rates.354 In fiscal year 2012, IJs conducted a total of 707 credible
fear reviews, vacating just eighty-one negative credible fear
determinations (11.5%).355 Less than five years later, the frequency of IJ
review had increased a hundred-fold, and the reversal rate had nearly
tripled: in fiscal year 2016, IJs conducted a total of 7,488 credible fear
reviews, vacating 2,086 negative credible fear determinations
(27.9%).356 Figure 1 shows these trends.
Figure 1:
Nationwide Total of IJ Reviews and Reversals, FY 2012–2016357
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354. See OFFICE OF PLANNING ANALYSIS AND STATISTICS, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION
REVIEW, FY 2016 STATISTICS YEARBOOK (2017), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/fysb16/
download [https://perma.cc/6YJJ-3JNQ].
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id.
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As Eagly, Shafer, and Whalley show, IJs reverse negative credible
fear findings more frequently in the family detention context than in
cases not involving families.358 Between 2007 and 2016, their study
found, IJs vacated 47% of the negative credible fear findings in five
family detention centers.359 In contrast, between 2001 and 2016,
approximately 16% of negative credible fear findings in non-family
detained cases were vacated on IJ review.360 Significantly, “family and
non-family detainees both obtained lawyers at an identical rate (23%)
during such proceedings.”361
Several factors may explain why IJs reverse negative credible fear
determinations at higher rates in cases involving detained families. First,
the credible fear screening process may be particularly ill-suited to
evaluating the claims of the women and children who make up the vast
majority of detained families. For example, female asylum seekers may
be reluctant to disclose to male officials the details of the gender-based
violence they have suffered, especially if accompanied by their
children.362 Moreover, DHS may have applied a more exacting credible
fear standard to asylum-seeking families, especially after 2014, in an
effort to deter other Central Americans from seeking protection in the
United States.363 Finally, many of the women and children fleeing
Central America have suffered gang-related harms, which do not map
neatly onto recognized grounds of relief.364 Before IJ review, detained
families may have consulted with pro bono attorneys who screened them
for additional bases of asylum eligibility or helped identify a nexus

358. Eagly, Shafer & Whalley, supra note 45, at 148.
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. See SHEPHERD & BERNSTEIN MURRAY, supra note 34, at 4.
363. See Manning, supra note 45, at Part III (“Four days before Artesia opened, Vice President
Joe Biden determined that ‘none of these children or women bringing children will be eligible under
the existing law in the United States.’” (quoting Press Release, White House, Remarks to the Press
with Q & A by Vice President Joe Biden in Guatemala (June 20, 2014), https://obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/20/remarks-press-qa-vice-president-joe-biden-guatemala
[https://perma.cc/7GV3-KYCK])).
364. See, e.g., Elizabeth Keyes, Unconventional Refugees, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 89, 140 (2017)
(“[T]hose fleeing gang violence generally are excluded from the definition of a refugee, unless they
can prove that violence is intended to punish them for one of the protected characteristics (a nexus
problem).” (emphasis in original)).
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between the harms they fled and a protected characteristic, such as a
particular social group.365
Regardless, since 2014 IJs have conducted credible fear reviews and
vacated negative fear findings in family detention cases at increasing
rates.366 In fiscal year 2014, 768 asylum seekers in family detention
requested IJ review of credible fear determinations.367 Total IJ reviews
dipped in 2014, but rose to 1,098 reviews in fiscal year 2016.368 Reversal
rates rose, as well.369 As shown in Figure 2, IJs reversed 40.4% of
negative credible fear findings in family detention cases in fiscal year
2014, 50.8% in fiscal year 2015, and 55.2% in fiscal year 2016.370 In
other words, in fiscal years 2015 and 2016, it was more likely than not
that where an IJ reviewed a negative credible fear determination in a
case involving a detained family, the IJ found that the Asylum Office
had erred.371
Figure 2:
Percentage of Negative Credible Fear Determinations Vacated on
IJ Review in Family Detention Centers, FY 2014–2016372
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365. See id. at 141 (noting that Central American asylum seekers “often win” asylum claims
based on gang violence, if they have the benefit of legal counsel (emphasis deleted)).
366. Eagly, Shafer & Whalley, supra note 45, at 148–49.
367. EOIR Data, supra note 353.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. Id.
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The aggregate figures disguise sharp differences in both the number IJ
reviews and reversal rates across the four family detention centers in
operation between 2014 and 2016. As Table 1 shows, asylum seekers
detained in Artesia in 2014 and in Dilley in 2015 and 2016 were more
likely to benefit from IJ review than families detained in Berks or
Karnes.373 In fiscal year 2016, for example, IJs vacated negative credible
fear determinations in approximately 68.3% of cases reviewed in Dilley;
negative fear findings were reversed in approximately 37% of cases
reviewed in Karnes.374 Such disparities may stem from divergent
approaches to IJ review among the various immigration courts—which
typically sit remotely, and conduct hearings by video feed—that
presided over the cases of detained families.375 Inconsistent judicial
behavior is also certain to play a role.376 Indeed, the EOIR data show
striking variations in the rates at which individual IJs reversed negative
credible fear determinations. In fiscal year 2016, for instance, one IJ who
conducted credible fear reviews at Dilley affirmed 146 negative
determinations and reversed seventy-two (33% reversal rate).377 Another
affirmed fourteen negative determinations and reversed 240 (94.5%
reversal rate).378
IJ review thus appears to replicate the decisional disparities that
plague the merits phase of asylum adjudications. In Refugee Roulette,
Professors Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew Schoenholtz, and Philip Schrag
exhaustively studied the outcomes of thousands of defensive and
affirmative asylum claims.379 Their data laid bare a system of

373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Inconsistent defensive and affirmative asylum adjudication has long been the subject of
academic attention. See, e.g., Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz & Schrag, supra note 75, at 302 (“[I]n
the world of asylum adjudication, there is remarkable variation in decision making from one official
to the next, from one office to the next, from one region to the next, from one Court of Appeals to
the next, and from one year to the next, even during periods when there has been no intervening
change in the law.”).
376. Id. at 342–49 (noting that an IJ’s gender and INS or DHS work experience heavily influence
the rate at which an IJ grants asylum). Although the Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz, and Schrag study
concerned grant-rates at the merits phase of an asylum adjudication, its insights about the impact of
an IJ’s gender and work experience are transferable to IJ review.
377. EOIR Data, supra note 353.
378. Id.
379. Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz & Schrag, supra note 75, at 295–96; see also ANDREW I.
SCHOENHOLTZ, PHILIP G. SCHRAG & JAYA RAMJI-NOGALES, LIVES IN THE BALANCE: ASYLUM
ADJUDICATION BY THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (2014) (examining statistical
disparities in affirmative asylum adjudications).
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adjudication that is neither consistent nor fair: “[w]hen an asylum seeker
stands before an official or court who will decide whether she will be
deported or may remain in the United States, the result may be
determined as much or more by who that official is, or where the court is
located, as it is by the facts and law of the case.”380 That insight applies
with equal force to both the credible fear interview and IJ review of
negative fear findings. Although IJs have reversed negative credible fear
determinations at remarkably high rates, particularly in family detention
cases, IJ review has produced uneven, judge-dependent outcomes.
Table 1:
Results of IJ Review in Family Detention Cases, FY 2014–2016381

FY 2014
Total IJ credible fear reviews
Total negative credible fear
findings vacated
Percentage of decisions
vacated
FY 2015
Total IJ credible fear reviews
Total negative credible fear
findings vacated
Percentage of decisions
vacated
FY 2016
Total IJ credible fear reviews
Total negative credible fear
findings vacated
Percentage of decisions
vacated

Artesia

Berks

Dilley

Karnes

293
149

18
2

-----

457
159

50.9%

11%

---

34.8%

52
32

14
0

314
190

94
19

61.5%

0%

60.5%

20.2%

-----

11
6

631
431

456
169

---

54.5%

68.3%

37%

Nonetheless, IJ review has emerged as an increasingly meaningful
form of protection against erroneous removal, particularly in the family
detention context.382 Between 2014 and 2016, IJs reversed the negative

380. Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz & Schrag, supra note 75, at 302.
381. Id.
382. See Eagly, Shafer & Whalley, supra note 45, at 147–50.
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credible fear findings of no fewer than 1,157 detained families.383 These
figures are especially noteworthy in light of the constrained role that
attorneys often play during IJ review.384 The high rates at which IJs have
vacated DHS’s credible fear findings in family detention cases discredit
the narrative—spun first by the Obama administration and now by the
Trump White House—that the families who are fleeing the Northern
Triangle have no rightful claim to humanitarian protection. To the
contrary, the majority of those families, whether or not they receive
positive fear findings after an initial interview, have credible fears of
persecution.385
B.

RFRs Can Remedy Erroneous Credible Fear Determinations

Official data on RFRs are hard to come by: USCIS does not include
RFRs in its annual credible fear statistics.386 What little data are
available, however, suggest that RFRs have protected numerous asylum
seekers with potentially meritorious claims.387 Between February 9,
2015, and March 31, 2016, asylum seekers detained in four family
detention centers submitted at least 400 RFRs to the asylum office.388
Just over half of these requests resulted in positive credible
determinations after reconsideration.389 Even as the Dilley detention
center saw the greatest number of IJ reversals of negative credible fear
determinations, it was also the site of the most successful RFRs, closely
followed by the Karnes detention center.390 Those figures likely speak to
both the error-prone nature of the credible fear interviews conducted
there and the presence of vigorous pro bono projects at the detention
centers.

383. EOIR Data, supra note 353.
384. See supra section II.A.2.
385. DHS ADVISORY COMM. REPORT, supra note 5, at 6 (noting that “nearly 90% of individuals
in family facilities from . . . countries [in the Northern Triangle] pass their credible or reasonable
fear interviews”).
386. See Credible Fear Statistics 2016, supra note 28.
387. See Credible Fear—Requests for Reconsideration, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS.
(Apr. 13, 2016), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Outreach/Upcoming%20National
%20Engagements/PED_RFR_CredibleFear033116.pdf [https://perma.cc/RV8L-NRCY].
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. Id.
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Figure 3:
Requests for Reconsideration in Family Detention Cases,
February 9, 2015 through March 31, 2016391
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IV. PROPOSED REFORMS TO IJ REVIEW AND RFRS:
UPHOLDING NONREFOULEMENT
IJ review and RFRs are far from toothless.392 But the immigration
agencies have failed to consistently administer either process,
undermining their potential to prevent the wrongful removal of people
who are lawfully entitled to air their claims for relief.393 Current political
realities weigh against abolishing expedited removal or reforming the
credible fear determination process; reforming IJ review and anchoring
RFRs in administrative rules present similar, but less formidable,
challenges. The proposals that follow reflect three propositions. First, IJ
review and RFRs protect asylum seekers’ due process rights without
exacting a prohibitively high administrative burden on the government.
Second, IJ review and RFRs support the United States’ obligations under
domestic and international law to refrain from removing asylum seekers
391. Id.
392. See supra Part III.
393. See supra Part II.
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to countries where they may suffer persecution or torture.394 And finally,
IJ review and RFRs will become meaningful correctives to the flaws of
the credible fear determination process only if asylum seekers have
greater access to counsel.
A.

EOIR Should Require IJs to Admit New Evidence and Allow
Counsel to Advocate During Credible Fear Reviews

EOIR should undertake at least two reforms to enhance the accuracy
and efficiency of IJ review. To begin, EOIR should require IJs to allow
asylum seekers to introduce evidence that was not presented during the
credible fear interview. This change would promote consistency among
IJs, and, in theory, would reduce IJ rubberstamping of negative credible
fear determinations. Moreover, opening the record would obey the call
of the regulations that govern IJ review: those require that the judge
make a de novo determination as to a noncitizen’s credible fear.395 In
principle, de novo hearings rely on a clean, unbounded record, rather
than a rehash of a prior—allegedly flawed—adjudication.396
Additionally, EOIR should amend the Immigration Court Practice
Manual to require that IJs allow counsel to advocate on behalf of clients
during credible fear reviews.397 Practical and statutory considerations
weigh in favor of this reform. An attorney may distill an asylum seeker’s
experience into legal arguments the asylum seeker is unlikely to
articulate, increasing both the efficiency and accuracy of IJ review,
particularly with respect to novel claims.398 Moreover, the current
limitations on attorney advocacy contravene the legislative purpose
underlying IJ review: the more restricted the attorney’s role, the less

394. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2012); UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’N FOR REFUGEES, 1967
PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES 30 (1967), http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.h
tml [https://perma.cc/J72G-P5QF].
395. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.42(d) (2017).
396. Schoenholtz, Schrag, and Ramji-Nogales make a similar point in describing the nature of
section 240 removal proceedings after an asylum seeker’s affirmative application has been denied.
SCHOENHOLTZ, SCHRAG & RAMJI-NOGALES, supra note 379, at 14.
397. See supra text accompanying notes 253–57.
398. See M. Margaret McKeown & Allegra McLeod, The Counsel Conundrum: Effective
Representation in Immigration Proceedings, in REFUGEE ROULETTE: DISPARITIES IN ASYLUM
ADJUDICATION AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 286, 290 (Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I.
Schoenholtz, & Philip G. Schrag, eds., 2009) (“Just outcomes are more likely . . . when effective
counsel is present, because the facts necessary to a fair determination of the case will be developed,
presented, and tested in light of the relevant law. In contrast, without an attorney or with an
ineffective attorney, individuals testifying are frequently unaware of how to impart even the most
fundamental information relating to the case to be decided.”).
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robust the review, and the weaker the procedure’s potential to correct
erroneous credible fear determinations.
Furthermore, an IJ who sidelines a representative during IJ review
arguably violates noncitizens’ right to counsel under federal law and due
process principles under the Fifth Amendment.399 The INA grants
noncitizens in “removal proceedings” the right to counsel at no expense
to the government.400 To this author’s knowledge, no court has
considered whether IJ reviews are “removal proceedings” within the
meaning of the INA.401 But federal regulations provide a broad right to
counsel in all immigration matters in which a person undergoes “an
examination,” a criterion IJ review surely satisfies.402 Under the
regulations, “the person involved” in such proceedings has “the right to
be represented by an attorney or representative who shall be permitted to
examine or cross-examine such person and witnesses, to introduce
evidence, to make objections . . . and to submit briefs.”403 Notably, the
regulations expressly disclaim a right to counsel during secondary
inspections;404 but they say nothing about credible fear determinations,
implying that the right attaches at all phases of the asylum process.405
Finally, an asylum seeker whose retained counsel is denied the
opportunity to speak or advocate during IJ review may well be deprived
of the “fundamental fairness” guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment’s due
process clause.406
Absent reform, IJ review will continue to replicate many of the same
problems that frustrate the initial credible fear determination. It is
cursory rather than searching, may be limited to a record just as narrow
as that involved in the initial interview, and is highly contingent on the IJ
before whom an applicant happens to appear. IJ review in its current
form is incapable of ensuring that the United States will not remove
399. U.S. CONST. amend. V; 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B).
400. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B) (stating that a noncitizen enjoys a right to counsel during
removal proceedings).
401. Id.
402. 8 C.F.R. §§ 292.5(b), 1292.5(b) (2017).
403. Id.
404. Id. But see Greg Boos & Robert Pauw, Reasserting the Right to Representation in
Immigration Matters Arising at Ports of Entry, 9 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 385 (2004) (suggesting
that noncitizens have a right under the Constitution and federal law to representation during
secondary inspection).
405. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 292.5(b), 1292.5(b).
406. See Matt Adams, Advancing the “Right” to Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 9 SEATTLE J.
SOC. JUST. 169, 177 (2010) (discussing how considerations of “fundamental fairness” might provide
a basis for expanding access to counsel in immigration proceedings).
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individuals to face persecution, torture, or death in their home countries.
That so many RFRs have been successful in recent years makes this
clear.
B.

DHS Should Adopt a Consistent Standard for Adjudicating RFRs

Three reforms may help RFRs prevent wrongful expedited removals.
First, DHS should direct its officials to refrain from removing asylum
seekers with pending RFRs. Such removals fly in the face of the United
States’ nonrefoulement obligations. Second, USCIS should adopt a clear
standard for adjudicating RFRs that comports with its mandate to
accurately assess asylum seekers’ fears of persecution. USCIS would
improve the status quo if it renewed its commitment to the “compelling
new information” standard outlined in the 1997 memorandum.407 Better
yet, USCIS should direct the Asylum Office to grant RFRs where
applicants show either that official error tainted the first interview or that
they wish to disclose any additional information about their claims. That
approach is consistent with the credible fear regulations’ preference that
persons with borderline claims be placed into removal proceedings
rather than face expedited removal.408 Finally, USCIS should codify
RFR procedures in regulations or publicly available agency guidance.
That would incentivize officials to follow uniform rules—and help
advocates hold officials to account when they do not.
C.

Limitations of the Proposed Reforms

Asylum seekers who lack access to counsel are unlikely to benefit
from the reforms proposed here. Courts often draw attention to the
“labyrinth”-like nature of removal proceedings and the profound
difficulties pro se noncitizens encounter in immigration court.409 Asylum
seekers who are represented at the merits phase prevail at substantially
higher rates than those who lack attorneys.410 In fiscal year 2016, for
407. See Expedited Removal Policy Guidance, supra note 39, at 1.
408. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(d)–(e).
409. See, e.g., Escobar-Grijalva v. INS, 206 F.3d 1331, 1334 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Deprivation of the
statutory right to counsel deprives an alien asylum-seeker of the one hope she has to threat a
labyrinth almost as impenetrable as the Internal Revenue Code.”).
410. Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz & Schrag, supra note 75, at 340 (stating that in their study,
“[r]epresented asylum seekers were granted asylum at a rate of 45.6%, almost three times as high as
the 16.3% grant rate for those without legal counsel”); Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Jonathan Jacobs,
The State of Asylum Representation: Ideas for Change, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 739, 745 (2002)
(noting that “statistics show that represented [asylum] applicants obtain relief at significantly higher
rates than unrepresented ones”).
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example, just 10% of pro se applicants were granted asylum; in contrast,
52% of represented asylum seekers won the right to remain the United
States.411 These disparities were even more pronounced in asylum cases
involving women and children.412
Asylum seekers who undergo credible fear interviews and IJ review
without counsel suffer disadvantages that resemble those unrepresented
applicants face at the merits phase: they are unfamiliar with proper
procedures, have trouble synthesizing facts with complicated legal
standards, and face heightened risks of intimidation or
miscommunication.413 Legal orientation programs may ameliorate these
problems, but cannot guide all vulnerable asylum seekers through the
credible fear determination process. As long as expedited removal
remains on the books, noncitizens should be appointed counsel once
they express fear of returning home.414 At least, noncitizens who receive
negative credible fear determinations should be appointed counsel before
IJ review.
Moreover, barring dramatic changes in DHS policy, the proposed
reforms will play out in the harsh confines of immigration detention.415
The harms of immigration detention, including its adverse impact on

411. TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, CONTINUED RISE IN ASYLUM DENIAL
RATES: IMPACT OF REPRESENTATION AND NATIONALITY (2017), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/rep
orts/448/ [https://perma.cc/F7AX-JP8T].
412. TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, REPRESENTATION IS KEY IN
IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING WOMEN WITH CHILDREN (2015), http://trac.syr.edu/immig
ration/reports/377/ [https://perma.cc/8UT3-XPTT].
413. See Sabrineh Ardalan, Access to Justice for Asylum Seekers: Developing an Effective Model
of Holistic Asylum Representation, 48 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1001, 1002 (2015) (“Along with
trauma, language barriers and cross-cultural differences can affect asylum seekers’ abilities to
recount their past experiences, as can a lack of understanding of the legal framework for asylum
claims.”).
414. See id. at 1026 (arguing in favor of “a universal right to counsel for asylum seekers”);
Nimrod Pitsker, Comment, Due Process for All: Applying Eldridge to Require Appointed Counsel
for Asylum Seekers, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 169, 171 (2007) (arguing that under the Mathews v. Eldridge
due process analysis, “the Constitution requires appointed counsel for asylum seekers”).
415. See Aria Bendix, ICE Shuts Down Program for Asylum-Seekers, ATLANTIC (June 9, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2017/06/ice-shuts-down-program-for-asylumseekers/529887/ [https://perma.cc/ND5Z-RJRV] (reporting Trump administration’s decision to
terminate a program that allowed asylum-seeking families to enroll in case management in lieu of
detention); Chris Hayes & Brian Montopoli, Trump Administration Plans Expanded Immigrant
Detention, Documents Say, NBC NEWS (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politicsnews/trump-administration-plans-expanded-immigrant-detention-documents-say-n729021
[https://perma.cc/HL8X-QUZR] (reporting that the Trump administration “is planning to radically
expand . . . the detention of immigrant families seeking asylum in the United States”).
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children and families, are serious and well documented.416 Detention
centers tend to be located in remote, rural areas.417 Asylum seekers in
detention face steep barriers to accessing counsel.418 They experience
trauma and depression at alarming rates.419 Medical care is often
inadequate.420 Telephone calls to family and attorneys are limited.421
Guards may be abusive.422 Children often yearn to escape.423 IJ review

416. See, e.g., César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Naturalizing Immigration Imprisonment,
203 CALIF. L. REV. 1449, 1452 (2015) (“Evidence shows that migrants suffer unthinkable harms
while imprisoned.”); WENDY CERVANTES, FIRST FOCUS CTR. FOR THE CHILDREN OF IMMIGRANTS,
FAMILY DETENTION: THE HARMFUL IMPACT ON CHILDREN 1 (2015), https://firstfocus.org/wp-con
tent/uploads/2015/07/Family-Detention.pdf [https://perma.cc/HPN6-MN9B] (citing research that
shows that “even a short amount of time in detention is harmful to children”); Letter from Am.
Immigration Law. Ass’n et al. to Megan Mack, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., The Psychological Impact
of Family Detention on Mothers and Children Seeking Asylum 2–4 (June 20, 2015), http://www.
aila.org/advo-media/press-releases/2015/impact-family-detention-mental-health/complaint-crcl
[https://perma.cc/7SZ3-48ZT] [hereinafter AILA Letter on Psychological Impact of Family
Detention] (compiling studies on harms of detention); OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC., CONCERNS ABOUT ICE DETAINEE TREATMENT AND CARE AT DETENTION
FACILITIES 6 (2017) (internal DHS report describing “disregard for detainees’ basic rights” in
various immigration detention centers).
417. See DHS ADVISORY COMM. REPORT supra note 5, at 40 (noting that existing family
detention centers “are over an hour’s drive one-way from major, metropolitan areas”).
418. Id.
419. AILA Letter on Psychological Impact of Family Detention, supra note 416, at 2.
420. See, e.g., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION ET AL., FATAL NEGLECT: HOW ICE IGNORES DEATHS
IN DETENTION 3 (2016), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/fatal_neglect_aclu
dwnnijc.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9FK-9S52] (noting that “poor medical care contributes to the death
of immigrants in federal immigration custody with alarming frequency”); Letter from Am.
Immigration Council et al. to Megan Mack & John Roth, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., ICE’s Failure to
Provide Adequate Medical Care to Mothers and Children in Family Detention Facilities 1 (July 30,
2015), http://www.aila.org/advo-media/press-releases/2015/deplorable-medical-treatment-at-famdetention-ctrs/public-version-of-complaint-to-crcl [https://perma.cc/99EC-GZC7] (summarizing
“complaint filed on behalf of several mothers and their children who received substandard medical
care while detained at the family detention facilities in Dilley and Karnes City, Texas, and Leesport,
Pennsylvania”).
421. See Julia Harumi & Carl Takei, Forget About Calling a Lawyer or Anyone at All if You’re in
an Immigration Detention Facility, AM. C.L. UNION (June 15, 2016), https://www.aclu.org/blog/
immigrants-rights/deportation-and-due-process/forget-about-calling-lawyer-or-anyone-all-if
[https://perma.cc/RQ2P-M4WF].
422. See Renée Feltz, Immigration Facility Guard Given Jail Time for Sexual Assault of
Detainee, GUARDIAN (Apr. 23, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/apr/23/immig
ration-detention-center-guard-sexual-assault-prison [https://perma.cc/BTW4-P9G2] (describing
conviction of guard for sexual assault of a nineteen-year-old mother detained in the Berks family
detention facility); Esther Yu His Lee, Chances Are High That if You’re Abused in Immigration
Detention, No One Will Care, THINKPROGRESS (Apr. 12, 2017), https://thinkprogress.org/dhs33000-complaints-abuse-civic-cf154614c006/ [https://perma.cc/X2H9-GW9G] (noting that DHS
“opened investigations into a total of 247 of 33,126 complaints lodged against its component
agencies between January 2010 and July 2016”).
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and RFRs can prolong the time an asylum seeker remains detained—in
some cases by a matter of days, and in others, weeks or months.424 IJ
review and RFRs thus have a double-edged quality: even as these
procedures allow asylum seekers to challenge the government’s order
that they return home, they keep asylum seekers behind bars, exacting a
price in liberty and dignity.
CONCLUSION
The Refugee Act of 1980 enshrines the United States’s commitment
to refrain from removing any person to a country where that person may
suffer persecution. Expedited removal has eroded that commitment. In
recent years, a growing number of noncitizens have been involuntarily
returned to homelands they said they feared, only to encounter death,
torture, or other harms. Asylum seekers who are ensnared in expedited
removal have little in the way of a safety net. But two procedures—IJ
review of negative credible fear determinations and RFRs—have in
hundreds of cases prevented the erroneous removal of people with
potentially meritorious claims.
IJ review is a crucial stopgap in the expedited removal regime.
Formulated by lawmakers who feared that expedited removal would
jeopardize asylum seekers’ claims for protection, IJ review was intended
to be a force for accuracy in a statutory scheme that privileges speed. IJ
review has helped compensate for the excesses of expedited removal,
particularly in the family detention context. But it is inconsistently
executed, highly dependent on the sympathies of individual judges, and
largely uncodified. EOIR can begin to correct for these deficiencies by
amending the Immigration Court Practice Manual to provide a greater
role for counsel during IJ review.
The credible fear regulations allow an asylum seeker to request
reconsideration after a negative credible fear determination.
Unfortunately, the RFR process remains opaque. The government has
423. See Valeria Fernández, These Asylum-Seekers Are Being Forced to Raise Their Kids in
Immigration “Jails,” PUB. RADIO INT’L (July 7, 2016), https://www.pri.org/stories/2016-0707/these-asylum-seekers-are-being-forced-raise-their-kids-immigration-jails
[https://perma.cc/64A3-FQ88].
424. In Eagly, Shafer, and Whalley’s study, supra note 45, on average, detained families waited
“three to four days” for IJ review of negative credible and reasonable fear determinations. But IJ
review may induce “other delays,” including “any delays in release following the judge’s reversal.”
Id. at 150. RFRs typically entail longer delays. In some cases, families who submitted RFRs were
detained for weeks or months after the credible fear review hearing. See CARA Project Complaint
to DHS, supra note 188, at 5, 9–10 (describing cases where families were detained for weeks or
months while RFRs were pending).
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failed to adhere to the policy guidance it set out shortly after expedited
removal took effect. It has also neglected to communicate any changes
in official policy that would explain why it has denied apparently
meritorious RFRs in recent years. As a result, the procedures
surrounding RFRs are shaped less by top-down rules than everyday
negotiations between frontline asylum officers, DHS personnel, and
advocates on behalf of asylum seekers. USCIS should direct all asylum
offices to grant RFRs where applicants show either that official error
tainted the first interview or that they wish to disclose additional
information about their claims. That standard is congruent with DHS’s
obligation to accurately assess asylum seekers’ fears of persecution.
A single-interview credible fear determination process does not and
cannot prevent the erroneous removal of asylum seekers with potentially
viable claims. As long as bona fide asylum seekers are sent home, the
United States will violate its obligations under the Refugee Convention
and offend the principle of nonrefoulement set forth in the INA.
Consistent, transparent policies on RFRs and IJ review cannot on their
own guarantee that the United States will refrain from returning asylum
seekers to countries where they may experience persecution—but they
can help.

